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PREFACE 
 
 
This paper is one of a series of four reports prepared for the Walter and 
Duncan Gordon Foundation in 2010. They result from a Foundation-directed 
project to help “re-imagine” the way in which Canada delivers foreign aid 
and development. 
 
Criticism of Canadian foreign aid, in general, and the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), in particular, is not new. But the current crisis of 
confidence in the effectiveness of Canada’s aid and development efforts appears to 
have reached a high water mark.  
 
The Foundation shares a concern voiced by many others; Canada’s reputation on the 
world stage is at risk if we don’t institute a fundamental transformation to our existing aid 
and development programs. This series of papers attempts to identify some of the 
challenges, opportunities and options that must be considered to effect the kind of 
modernization that is required. 
 
The other papers in this series include: (i) A New National Project for Canadian 
Development Cooperation prepared by Liam Swiss with the assistance of Simon 
Maxwell (ii) Modernizing Canadian Foreign Aid and Development: Challenges old and 
new  by Patrick Johnston and (iii) Future Directions for Canadian Foreign Aid and 
Development: summary of a roundtable discussion. All papers can be downloaded from 
the Foundation’s website at www.gordonfn.org. 
 
 
 
 
July 2010 
Toronto 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This paper offers a detailed comparative study of Norwegian and UK aid architectures, 
with a view to informing discussions on reform and renewal within Canada’s 
development programme.  This is undertaken via a quantitative assessment of each 
country’s standing on accepted measures of donor performance, as well as via a 
qualitative case study that traces and compares the processes and nature of 
organizational reforms undertaken in Norway and the UK.  Based on this quantitative 
and qualitative analysis, lessons for Canada are presented along four key dimensions, 
namely strategy, governance, policy processes and organizational management.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
A discernable unease has set in among internal and external observers of Canada’s 
development programme of late.  There is a palpable sense in which the development field 
has evolved to accommodate more actors, different priorities and new theories that have 
left Canada’s role as a foreign aid donor increasingly outdated and ineffectual.  Emerging 
donors like China and India, new development challenges like climate change and global 
security, the relative importance of private flows to emerging markets, the emergence of 
philanthro-capitalism as a social movement, new theories that question the role of aid in 
development—the last decade has brought tremendous changes to the operational 
environments of international development that require donor reform and renewal.   
A number of ideas now exist for how to drive change within Canada’s development 
programme in the face of such changes, with the challenge now to examine the 
underlying evidence base that supports competing recommendations.1  Part of this task 
involves anchoring possible reform options to quantitative metrics and qualitative 
details of development management and organization gathered from countries other 
than Canada.  It is hoped that in doing so this paper can create a common starting 
point for policy discussions and decisions regarding future pathways for Canadian 
development cooperation.  
While change can involve many dimensions, it is the governance structures 2 for Canada’s 
development cooperation that have recently come under scrutiny.  Three options typically 
discussed for Canada are: (a) a strengthened development ministry with responsibility for 
both policy and implementation, (b) a development cooperation unit embedded within a 
ministry of foreign affairs and (c) an arms-length agency.  While the arms length Crown 
Corporation structure has recently been championed as a way forward for Canada in many 
                                                 
1 There now exists a substantial selection of reports and publications with very specific recommendations for 
reform (Auditor General of Canada, 2009; Brown & Jackson, 2009; Canadian Council for International 
Cooperation, 2009; Canadian International Council, 2010; Carin & Smith, 2010; Goldfarb & Tapp, 2006; 
Government of Canada, 2007). 
2 A governance structure is defined as the formal institutional arrangements that unite state actors managing 
aid resources or involved in development policy.  It is used synonymous with the term ‘aid architecture’ 
(International Development Association, 2007: 1). 
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quarters, it is important to recognize that no country in the world exclusively uses this 
structure to organize its development programme.  Where arms length agencies exist, 
responsibility for policy will always be located within a government ministry.  Agency 
functions are de-limited to implementation, possessing little, if any, inter-governmental 
policy power.  They are deliberately locked out of the political sphere where strategic 
decisions regarding policy content get made.  
In this light, this paper concentrates on options (a) and (b) via an in-depth examination of 
experiences in Norway and the United Kingdom (UK).  The choice of Norway and the UK 
to make sense of Canadian dilemmas is an interesting one.  Many researchers laud the 
UK as a good model for Canada.  The independence of its Department for International 
Development (DFID), the seniority of its Ministers, and the country’s strong financial and 
political commitment to development issues, are all cited as reasons to look across the 
Atlantic for solutions.  By comparison, Norway is often less understood as a model of good 
donor performance, although its Scandinavian-style generosity and reputation for 
progressive internationalism are often cited positively.  Norway, in fact, provides a 
governance structure for development that is highly divergent from the UK’s, with both 
policy and implementation functions fully integrated within its Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA).  This contrasts to the models provided by both the UK and Canada, where a 
ministry or agency that is not the ministry of foreign affairs is responsible for both 
development policy and administration. The perceived high performance of both the UK 
and Norway, notwithstanding highly divergent governance structures, suggests the need to 
look closer at each country’s experience to understand the drivers of donor performance.  
The fact that both countries undertook dramatic re-organizations of their aid programme 
relatively recently, with DFID created in 1997 and the MFA taking over responsibilities for 
development in 2004, offers additional lessons for Canada as it ponders the value of 
organizational reform for improving its effectiveness as an aid-giving nation. 
The paper suggests that neither case offers easy answers for squeezing out higher levels 
of performance from a development programme.  There is much more than governance 
structure that cultivates donor performance. A more nuanced picture is painted of the 
Norwegian and UK cases, one that hopefully underlines the complexity of issues that need 
to be confronted when looking to either country as a model for Canada.  Decisions about 
governance structures are ultimately subservient to strong expressions of political will and 
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vision, preferably bipartisan ones that can unite Canadians of different political 
persuasions.  No reform will be effective without a propitious political context.  In the 
absence of strong political leadership and vision, reform must always begin by considering 
how to create conducive political environments and relationships that will be the pillars of 
successful changes to Canada’s development programme. Managerial governance 
reforms that seek to bypass political challenges of the day are as futile as they are costly.   
Assuming political questions are tackled, a governance structure like the UK’s is 
recommended over Norway’s.  A separate development ministry that is centrally 
embedded in government processes is the only institutional arrangement that can ensure 
development policy is both strong and coherent.  A separate ministry can accommodate a 
wide range of development policies and organizational functions, from those that 
strategically align with foreign policy concerns to those that are motivated by a global 
humanitarian imperative.  In contradistinction, a governance structure that merges 
development into the larger concerns of a foreign ministry can never sustainably and 
robustly champion development policies that may challenge nationalistic, commercial or 
geo-political motivations for giving aid.   
In order to advance these arguments, the paper is structured around four key questions.  
First, how does Canada perform against Norway and the UK as a donor? Section 2 
presents comparative statistical data on variables relating to donor organization thought to 
contribute to improved poverty outcomes.  The purpose of this section is to quantitatively 
assess the success of all three countries on measures commonly used to rank donor 
performance, even if robust causality has yet to be established between any of these 
indicators and improved outcomes for poverty reduction.  In comparative perspective 
however, the results confirm that Canada trails the Norway and the UK on many of the 
measures, although its performance on some indicators is better than expected, especially 
when compared to other donor countries within the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC).  Secondly, how did existing aid architectures emerge in the UK and Norway? 
Section 3 proceeds to examine the triggers for reorganization in both the UK and Norway, 
highlighting the ways in which visions aligned with political interests in such a way that 
defined the course of organizational reform. What did these governance structures achieve 
and what were their limitations? Section 4 builds on the previous one by presenting the 
actual reforms undertaken and the different paths to performance walked by each country.   
In contrast to the earlier quantitative assessment of donor performance, this section 
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examines performance based on how key stakeholders in the transnational, state and civil 
society realms perceive the performance of their national development programme.  It is 
assumed here that the perceptions of performance by key external stakeholders can proxy 
for the UK’s and Norway’s actual performance.  The narrative that is presented is one 
where success has emerged via highly divergent trajectories in Norway and the UK, 
although in neither case has success kept new challenges at bay.  Finally, what lessons 
can be gleaned to inform organizational changes in Canada’s development programme?  
Section 5 ties together the case study material and searches for lessons for Canada within 
the Norwegian and UK experiences.  This includes lessons on the strategies that can best 
advance a reform agenda, guidance on specific governance structures for development 
cooperation, suggestions for strengthening development policy process and ways to 
improve micro-organizational behaviour.  
Methodologically, the narratives presented of the Norwegian and UK experiences are 
anchored to qualitative methods used in comparative case study analysis.  Elite 
interviews were used to retrospectively trace processes of reform and to gauge 
perceptions of performance.  Over thirty interviews were conducted over March and April 
2010, by telephone and via in-person interviews held in both Oslo and London.  These 
semi-structured interviews took place with stakeholders representing the transnational, 
state and civil society constituencies for each country.  Participants spoke on the 
condition of anonymity, hence the lack of attribution in many quotations found in the text.  
Interview data was supplemented with an extensive review of secondary literatures 
published in English on Norway and British development policy, with occasional 
reference to Norwegian texts.3  Internal documentary sources, policy literatures and 
news/internet sources were also consulted.  This vast database of material forms the 
empirical basis for the claims that follow.  While no primary research was conducted in 
Canada, the extensive academic literature on Canadian development cooperation was 
examined to ensure lessons remained anchored to a sufficiently realistic understanding 
of the challenges faced there. In order to validate findings, a draft copy of the report was 
circulated for comment to all interviewees. The overall result is a quantitative and 
qualitative comparative portrait of two donors operating in distinct national jurisdictions 
with a view to informing policy and practices in Canada.  
                                                 
3 A multilingual research assistant allowed for an examination of some Norwegian texts. 
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COMPARING PERFORMANCE IN NUMBERS 
 
This section presents statistical data to assess Canada’s achievement on a number of key 
variables that are assumed to contribute to improved donor performance.  International 
benchmarking of donor countries via performance metrics is now a popular sub-field 
among economists with development policy interests (Easterly & Pfutze, 2008; Knack, 
Rogers & Eubank, 2010; Roodman, 2006; Williamson, 2010).  This is the case even if the 
casual relation between high achievement on metrics, donor interventions and improved 
development outcomes is unclear.  The data presented here have their origins in such 
studies, while for some variables data is extracted from databases, national reports and 
OECD policy papers.  The purpose of this section is to paint a picture of donor 
performance in numbers that can complement the comparative case studies that follow.  
FINANCIAL INPUTS 
 
The UK is among the largest bilateral donors in the DAC in terms of resource 
disbursement while both Canada and Norway are mid-sized donors. The latter two are 
fairly similar in terms of absolute resources devoted to development assistance, 
notwithstanding the fact that Norway’s Gross National Income (GNI) is approximately one-
third that of Canada (Table 1). 
 
 
Table 1 - Donor inputs to development, ODA net disbursement 2008 
                     
ODA (million USD)  ODA % of GNI     % of global ODA   Donor rank**      
                                                                                                                                                  
Canada         4 795                          0.35                       3.52                     10                                                   
Norway         3 963                          0.88                       2.91                     12 
UK                11 500                        0.44                       8.44                      4 
 
DAC 
Average*      5 924 
 
 
Sources: Data taken from Williamson (2010, p.29) and OECD, International Development  
Statistics online. * 23 bilateral donors.  **Donor rank by % share of total ODA 
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Figure 1 tracks Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) as a percentage of GNI for all 
three countries.  Whereas Norway has exceeded the United Nations’ target of 0.7 percent 
of GNI for several decades, both Canada and the UK have hovered between .2% and .5% 
over the same period, with the UK distancing itself from Canada in the last decade.  
Canada has roughly mirrored the DAC average. 
 
Figure 1:  ODA as a percentage of Gross National Income 
(1980-2008)
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Source: (OECD, 2010)
 
Figure 1: ODA as a percentage of Gross National Income (1980–2008) 
 
CHANNELS FOR DEVELOPMENT SPENDING 
 
Donor countries possess dual channels for development spending: bilateral4 and 
multilateral.  Multilateral channels are thought to be superior, as they tend to be less 
biased towards national prerogatives and are a way to coordinate donor flows.  Table 2 
illustrates that Canada directs roughly the same amount as Norway through bilateral 
channels, though there are important reasons to suspect this figure. The category 
‘bilateral’ in the table includes monies given to multilateral agencies that are 
earmarked to initiatives specified by the donor.  While Norwegian statistics defines 
such spending in a third category called multi-bilateral finance (mainly because 
implementation is multinational though driven by bilateral imperatives and 
                                                 
4 Funding for civil society is typically classified as bilateral assistance. 
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conditionalities), the UK and Canada include these flows in the bilateral category.  
Multi-bilateral finance represents 35% of Norway’s bilateral assistance and 20% of the 
UK’s.5  If we were to count multi-bilateral finance as ‘multilateral’ however, Norway 
would be providing 41.3% of its funding in bilateral channels and 58.7% in multilateral 
channels, with the UK closely following with 39.8 % bilateral and 60.2% multilateral. 
This would mean that the UK and Norway allocate similar proportions of their budget to 
bilateral and ‘multi’ channels. Unfortunately we could not calculate a similar statistic for 
Canada because figures that break down Canada’s multi-bilateral assistance are 
publicly unavailable. 
Williamson (2010) ranks donors according to their overhead costs and suggests Norway 
has a lower cost structure than both the UK and Canada.  Nevertheless, she cautions 
inferring too much from these rankings because overhead calculations are not 
standardized across agencies.  In 2009, Norway reported 1.35% of its total ODA as 
administrative cost, while the UK reported 4.1% in 2008/2009.  Canada only reported 
administrative costs for CIDA rather than the entire development programme, listing it as 
7% of all CIDA IAE-related expenditures6 in 2008/2009.  Given intractable measurement 
problems, all of the comparative administrative cost data must be interpreted with care. 
 
 
Table 2 - Channels for development spending* 
 % bilateral**           % multilateral          
ODA to total ODA       ODA to total ODA    
 
Canada  72.0                 27.0                                 
Norway            76.3                                23.7                                 
UK                    59.8      40.2                                 
 
 
Sources: Data for Canada is taken from 2008/09 in (CIDA, 2010: 11) and in the absence of figures quoted in 
terms of ODA, we assume that IAE figures for CIDA are a reasonably proxy for ODA; data for the UK is from 
2008/09 and is taken from DFID (2009b, p.13); and data for Norway is from 2009 and is taken from NORAD 
(2010, in-house). *Note these figures do not include administrative costs. ** Earmarked trust funds to 
multilateral organizations, or multi-bilateral aid, is treated as bilateral aid for the purposes of this table. 
                                                 
5 (Department for International Development, 2009c: 13); NORAD, in house 
6 The International Assistance Envelope (IAE) is the overarching framework within which ODA is 
programmed in Canada. 
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DE-CENTRALIZATION AND DE-CONCENTRATION 
 
The de-centralization of staff and the de-concentration of authorities to field level is 
increasingly associated with a donor’s ability to build local relationships, quickly respond 
to programming needs and facilitate improved donor collaboration.  A common proxy for 
an aid donor’s decentralization is the allocation of employees across headquarters and 
field offices.  Table 3 suggests Canada is both a large organization (its ratio of ODA 
committed by employees is the lower than both Norway and the UK’s) and a highly 
centralized one.  High centralization is not necessarily a negative; for example, one can 
imagine that an efficient administrative system might require less staff in the field 
(OECD, 2009b).  Nevertheless, Canada has yet to be described in these terms. 
Another measure of donor performance is the delegated financial authority to field 
offices. According to an OECD donor survey conducted in 2008/09, Canada’s field 
offices do not have the authority to commit new ODA monies and their authority to 
disburse existing funds has a ceiling of USD 500 000 (OECD, 2009b).  By contrast, 
Norway’s field offices can commit and disburse unlimited amounts of ODA as long as 
there is some basis for this outlay within an approved strategic plan.  The UK can also 
disburse an unlimited amount at field level but with an upper limit of USD 15 million for 
new commitments (OECD, 2009b: 5–6). 
 
 
Table 3 - De-centralization in donor employment 2008/09 
       Total no. of         % of employees:       % of employees:     ODA/employee        
       employees         headquarters          field                        (million USD) 
 
Canada       2 838                   62.3                         37.7          1.69 
Norway      1 176                    49.7                         50.3            3.37 
UK              2 671                    52.2                         47.8                        5.06 
 
DAC        
Average*   1 996                    48.6                          51.4                         
 
 
 
Source: Data on employment is taken from OECD (2009b: 7); ODA data is taken from OECD, International 
Development Statistics online. * Based on 19 bilateral donors 
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FRAGMENTATION 
 
Donors are regularly advised to focus their bilateral aid on fewer countries, sectors and 
projects in order to minimize duplication, reduce transaction costs and specialize in their 
areas of comparative advantage (OECD, 2008a).  Canada borders on obsession in its 
search for focus and the data below suggest this endless search may be producing 
fruits.   While Canada has almost consistently had less concentration in its top 20 
recipients than Norway and UK, recent figures suggest some amount of concentration is 
emerging in its geographic allocations (Figure 2).  Canada still has a higher number of 
aid recipients (173) compared to the UK (150) and Norway (132) (OECD, 2010). 
A further proxy for aid fragmentation is the number of donor projects.  While Canada 
disburses less than half of the UK’s aid budget, it is largely on par with the UK in terms 
of the number of aid projects it finances (Table 4).  Canadian project aid is, however, 
currently less fragmented than the DAC average. 
Source: (OECD, 2010) 
Figure 2: Partner Country Fragmentation (1980–2008) 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Partner Country Fragmentation (1980-2008) 
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Table 4 - Project fragmentation 2008 
                      Number of projects             ODA per project 
                                                                  (million USD, net disbursed) 
 
Canada        2 049   2.34     
Norway         4 208                                   0.94 
UK                 2 460                                  4.67 
 
DAC                         
Average*      3 591                                    1.65 
       
 
Sources: Data taken from Williamson (2010, p.29) and OECD International Development 
Statistics online; * 23 bilateral donors 
 
Williamson (2010) grades donors according to their overall specialization in certain 
countries, sectors and projects.  Interestingly, Canada, Norway and the UK all achieve 
rankings at the lower end of the table.  Each country achieves similar levels of sectoral 
fragmentation in their program, and their geographic and project allocation are all 
relatively fragmented.7  The author concludes that Canada on the whole is more 
fragmented than UK aid and less fragmented than Norwegian aid, although all fare 
poorly (Table 5).  Aid from some smaller donors, notably Austria, Portugal and Italy, is 
considerably less fragmented.   
 
Table 5 - Aid fragmentation 2008* 
 Country, sector and project         
                         fragmentation (rank)      
 
Canada  14                  
Norway             16                                  
UK                     12                                 
 
 
Sources: Data taken from Williamson (2010, p. 33) *Adjusted ranking among 23 bilateral donors 
 
AID SELECTIVITY 
                                                 
7 The average ODA/project data in Table 4 is but one of the factors contributing to the rank allocated in 
Table 5.  For more details, see Williamson (2010). 
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While there is an academic debate about the value of aid selectivity and the conditions 
necessary for making aid effective at country level, both the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness and the subsequent Accra High Level Forum emphasize that aid should 
go to poor countries that are democratic and where corruption is low (Williamson, 2010: 
14).  Williamson (2010) measures donors’ portfolios in terms of shares going to countries 
that have low levels of corruption, are classified as politically free and/or democratic, and 
are low-income countries.  As Table 6 below shows, aid from Canada in 2008 was better 
targeted to low-income countries in comparison with other donors, including the UK and 
Norway.  It is, of course, conceivable that Canada’s recent shift in priority away from 
Africa and towards Latin America may jeopardize this relative concentration.   
 
 
 
Table 6 - Aid selectivity 2008 
 Aid selectivity    % of ODA to     % of ODA to     % of ODA to 
                         (rank)                 non-corrupt        politically free   low income country  
 
Canada  11 33.49  18.74 59.01 
Norway            15 40.23  10.04 43.32 
UK                       4 42.36  21.59 47.92 
 
DAC                         
Average*                                    39.13  18.30 38.43        
       
 
Sources: Data taken from Williamson (2010, p. 35) * Based on 23 bilateral donors. 
TIED AID 
Tied aid is aid given with the condition that it may only be spent procuring goods and 
services from the donor country, or from a defined group of sources.  In 2008, five bilateral 
donors had less than one percent of their aid tied.  Several donors, however, still maintain 
large shares of tied aid, notably southern European donors and the United States. 
Canada’s share of tied aid was 9.23 percent in 2008, down from 43 percent in 2004. In 
2008, the Canadian Minister for International Cooperation announced that all Canadian 
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aid would be untied by 2013.  Norway began untying its aid in the 1980s and by 2002, 
there were only a few residual areas of tying.  The UK fully untied its aid in 2000. 8 
 
 
Table 7 - Share of tied aid 2008 
Canada               9.23   
Norway          0.01       
UK         0.00 
 
DAC                   
Average*                                          13.52 
 
 
Source: Data taken from Williamson (2010, p.37). * Based on 22 bilateral donors. 
 
MINISTERIAL TURNOVER 
 
Stable leadership structures are believed to enhance effective development cooperation 
(OECD, 2008a).  The frequent turnover of Canada’s political leadership in development 
is thought to negatively impact Canadian development cooperation, providing an 
unstable and uncertain context for planning (Lalonde, 2009: 140).  From mid-1997 to 
mid-2007, Canada has had six different Ministers for International Development.9  This 
compares to four different Ministers for International Development in Norway and three 
in the UK over the same period.  
EMPLOYEE SATISFACTION 
 
Employee satisfaction is thought to contribute to donor performance as it can proxy 
motivation to accomplish organizational goals.  While Canada and UK have recently 
published public service employment surveys by department, no comparable study for 
Norway was found.  In the UK, an in-house employee engagement score that assesses 
loyalty, retention and commitment is calculated for each department and the civil service 
at large.  DFID’s employee engagement index was one of the highest among all 
ministries, almost 20% higher than the average civil service score (Cabinet Office, 
                                                 
8 (Clay,Geddes & Natali, 2009). 
9 CIDA has also had four presidents over ten years. 
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2010).  The 2008 Canadian Public Service Employee Survey (Treasury Board 
Secretariat, 2008) suggest CIDA staff are approximately 10% below the public service 
average (68%) in terms of being satisfied with their department.  While a meaningful 
direct comparison of this data is difficult, it provides some anecdotal evidence for 
differing levels of employee satisfaction across these donors.   
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR AID 
 
Public awareness of, and support for, development cooperation is the best guarantee for 
ensuring continued political and legislative support for development assistance (OECD, 
2008a: 8).  A 2007 poll by the Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs Institute indicated 
that 70% of respondents surveyed felt Canada had a moral obligation to help poor 
countries (Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2007).  Interestingly, a high 
percentage of Conservative voters (61%) solidly support development assistance 
(OECD, 2007: 27).  While this support may appear substantial, aid often polls at the top 
of the list when in comes to areas targeted for cutbacks.  This finding is similar to a 
recent survey on British public attitudes to development that highlight aid is a highly 
supported area of government expenditures that is given low priority when presented 
against domestic priorities (Department for International Development, 2009b).  While 
public support for development in the UK has been over 70 percent since 1999 (OECD, 
2006: 25), a recent poll showed that a large share of respondents thought that people in 
poor countries were not as deserving of UK tax money as people in the UK (International 
Development Select Committee, 2009: 43).  It is a similar situation in Norway where 
public support reached an all-time high of 90% in 2007, though there is a strong 
sentiment expressed that aid is often wasted (OECD, 2008b: 24–25).  These numbers 
reflect the general principle that the noble aims of aid are often far too intangible for the 
public, particularly when contrasted against the tangible benefits of domestic 
expenditures.  While this might make aid nearly always politically expendable (White as 
quoted in Morrison, 1998: 443), this is to be contrasted with the decision by the UK 
Coalition Government to only ring-fence the health and development budgets from cuts 
to programmatic spending of 25% over four years.10  
  
                                                 
10 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/10457352.stm (Accessed June 30, 2010) 
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CIVIL SOCIETY PARTNERS 
 
A range of organizations with development interests populates civil society, including 
non-governmental organizations, church groups and unions among others.  Civil society 
actors can either be domestically registered or registered in other jurisdictions, the latter 
category including indigenous, regional and international based groups.  In Canada, 
funding for civil society organizations goes through two major channels, Canadian 
Partnership Branch that is providing financial support (mainly operational funding) to civil 
society organizations deemed ‘partners’ and Geographic Programmes where civil 
society actors are executing CIDA projects.    
 
Canada channels the lion’s share of its civil society funding to domestic based 
organizations, more than Norway and the UK.  The difference may be explained by the 
fact that both the UK and Norway provide direct financing to local civil society actors 
whereas Canada rarely does, although data currently inaccessible to the public would be 
required to ascertain this for sure. 
 
 
 
Table 8 - Funding to civil society as a percentage of total civil society spending 
                      Domestic civil society                 Non-domestic civil society*  
 
Canada** 84.5 15.5                                  
Norway            65.9 34.1 
UK 72.8 27.2 
 
 
Sources: Data for Canada is from 2008/09 and is taken from CIDA (CIDA, 2010: 20); data for 
Norway is from 2009 and taken from NORAD (in-house statistics). Data from the UK is taken from 
(Department for International Development, 2009c: 13, 28) *Note non-domestic includes funding 
for local (i.e. indigenous), regional and international NGOs  
** Includes all CIDA spending on civil society via all existing channels 
 
For fiscal year 2006/07, the most recent year where data is available, CIDA supported 
294 civil society organizations with operational funds (ie. via Canadian Partnership 
Branch) of USD 216 million.  If NGOs receiving funds for programme execution are also 
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included (via Geographic Programmes), the number of organizations rises to 581. Civil 
society recipients are fewer and better funded in the UK and Norway than in Canada.    
 
Table 9 - Concentration of support for civil society                                                  
                              Number of organizations     Funding (US mil)  Avg grant/org (US mil) 
 
Canada (2006/2007)           294*    216   0.73 
Norway (2010)  103    244   2.37 
UK (2008/2009)    96    510   5.31 
 
 
Source: CIDA (2009, table C-1), DFID (2009b: p. 28 and Table 19), NORAD (inhouse statistics);  
* This figure only include NGOs receiving core funding by Canadian Partnership Branch.   
OVERALL RANKINGS 
 
The figures above suggest Canada is not as strong a donor when compared to Norway 
and UK against quantitative indicators, although this is not necessarily consistent across 
all measures of performance.  While there is reason to lament Canada’s low 
achievement on these metrics, it is also important to recognize that Canada ranks above 
the DAC average on many of the common proxies used to assess aid effectiveness.  
Recent assessments of CIDA as an “ineffective” donor agency unfortunately do not 
contextualize their appraisals in relation to evidence drawn from the wider donor 
community (Canadian International Council, 2010; Carin & Smith, 2010; Government of 
Canada, 2007).  Nevertheless, it is also relevant to reflect on the data and 
methodological limitations in these ranking systems.  For one, comparable robust data 
simply does not exist.  Moreover, there are limited robust causal linkages between any 
of these factors and improved impact of donor aid in reducing poverty.  To illustrate, the 
widely publicized finding that aid works in good policy environments (Burnside & Dollar, 
2000) is challenged by many economists though we continue to assume focused 
investment in well-governed countries is beneficial (Easterly,Levine & Roodman, 2003; 
Hansen & Tarp, 2000; Rajan & Subramanian, 2008; Roodman, 2007).  Nor are we sure 
that focus and specialization are necessarily universal goods, with most of the evidence 
being “impressionistic and anecdotal” (Munro, 2005).  In addition, there is often little 
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consistency across ranking systems that all broadly attempt to assess donor 
performance, suggesting underlying weaknesses in theoretical conception, 
methodological processes and data imperfections.  For example in 2008, Easterly and 
Pfutze ranked Canada 15th out of 23 bilateral donors, while the UK placed first and 
Norway second (Easterly & Pfutze, 2008).  In 2010, Williamson changed methodologies 
at the margins and updated data, ranking Canada 13th out of 23, with the UK ranked 3rd 
and Norway 12th.11  A recent benchmarking exercise to assess 28 bilateral donors’ ‘aid 
quality’ in terms of selectivity, alignment, harmonization and specialization ranks the UK 
4th, Norway 8th and Canada 21st (Knack,Rogers & Eubank, 2010).  It is unclear what all of 
these rankings actually tell us about what determines and drives donor performance.  
The next section presents the comparative case studies of re-organization and reform in 
Norway and the UK to offer a richer examination of the political, organizational and 
policy dynamics that lie behind these numbers. 
                                                 
11 It is therefore impossible to judge whether this is a case of improvement by Canada since the Easterly 
and Pfutze (2008) study or a case of methodological non-equivalence between the two studies. 
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TRIGGERS FOR RE-ORGANIZATION 
 
 
 
Based on the data presented in Section 2, Norway and the UK do seem to be highly 
performing donors, especially when compared to Canada.  At the same time, the UK and 
Norway are different models of aid architecture, with Norway having integrated its 
development activities under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2004 while the UK de-
merged its development activities from under the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) in 1997.  This section explores the triggers for this governance reform in the years 
prior to re-organization.  In both cases, the impetus for change can be explained by the 
demands for organizational reform aligning with political interests of the day.  Reform 
was the product of a new political vision that could justify new governance structures, 
with the choice of structure guided by powerful political interests.  In both cases, the 
precondition for governance reform appeared to be a convincing vision for development 
policy coinciding with the interests of senior political figures.  What follows is a deeper 
exposition of dynamics existing prior to shifts in aid architecture. 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Though the creation of an independent development ministry with the objective of 
poverty reduction emerged after the election of a Labour government in 1997, important 
antecedents existed for this shift.  Prior to 1997, the Overseas Development 
Administration (ODA-UK), a branch of the FCO, had considerable spending autonomy, a 
separate Permanent Secretary and a desire to achieve poverty reduction.  Commercial, 
industrial and geopolitical interests sat alongside this nobler aim however, best 
exemplified by the controversial Pergau Dam affair where aid was linked to business 
contracts found to be unlawful (Barder, 2005; Maxwell, 1996; Vereker, 2002: 136).  
While some suggest continuities existed between ODA-UK and DFID, most 
acknowledge that the Labour party’s position on development did mark an important 
break from the previous Conservative regime. 
In the years leading up to the May 1997 election, the Labour Party presented itself as 
offering an end to ideological and class politics, with modern policy making driven by 
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evidence, expertise and a holistic approach to policy via “joined-up government”.12  
Labour promised to remove the sleaze that linked business, especially UK arms 
exporters, to foreign policy.  This coincided with increasing global commitment by the 
transnational development community to tackle the human dimensions of poverty as the 
failures of the neo-liberal Washington consensus became apparent.  Chairing a Labour 
Party Policy Commission, the Labour Foreign Affairs opposition critic at the time, Robin 
Cook, recommended the creation of a separate government department responsible for 
international development.  There was precedent to such a demand; in 1964–1970 
Labour kept a manifesto promise and created a separate Ministry of Overseas 
Development that was eventually dismantled in 1970 following the re-election of a 
Conservative Government.  Separate development departments (not necessarily headed 
by a Cabinet Minister) have since been a feature of Labour governments in the UK, 
while integrated development departments within the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Offices a characteristic of Conservative governments.13  
In Robin Cook’s proposal, a government department for development would be focused 
on poor countries, with considerably less emphasis on advancing British strategic 
interests using the instruments of aid.  This recommendation fit nicely with the New 
Labour agenda, currents of thinking in global development policy and with agendas of 
domestic civil society actors.  Barder (2005) claims Cook’s proposal was not considered 
in any great detail, passing relatively unnoticed into the Labour Party policy statement on 
foreign affairs in the run-up to the 1997 election.  Notwithstanding, the creation of DFID 
must be understood as a principled commitment to strengthen an internationalist 
progressive vision of development policy by de-merging development policy from foreign 
policy.  As one long-standing employee working in DFID at the time of the transition 
pointed out: “It was about saying this is a new organization…at the top, DFID stemmed 
from a big and ambitious vision about global poverty reduction and elimination.” 
While opposition to extraction from FCO existed, this did not prevent the Permanent 
Secretary for ODA-UK, John Vereker, from engaging in conversations with what was 
                                                 
12 Barder (2005) provides a good overview of this period. 
13 This correlation between aid architecture and party affiliation has not been the case in Canada.  For 
example the External Aid Office sat within External Affairs from 1963-1968 under the Liberal minority 
Government of Lester B. Pearson. CIDA has maintained its separate departmental status since its 
creation in 1968 under both Liberal and Conservative governments though it has not always had a 
separate Minister of International Cooperation.   
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considered essentially a government-in-waiting.  Vereker met Clare Short, then Labour 
Party Shadow spokesperson for Overseas Development, where it was confirmed that in 
the likely event of a Labour win there would be a government department independent of 
the Foreign Office headed by a Cabinet Minister.  This early preparation for an eventual 
separation is cited as an important first step in turning ODA-UK into DFID (Vereker, 
2002: 137).  One interviewee points out that the choice of Clare Short as Secretary of 
State for International Development 14 was not obvious given she had more interest and 
experience in domestic issues, having been demoted from the position of Shadow 
Transport Secretary to the international development file only a few months before 
Labour’s election win. It also merits considering that Short represented the left wing of 
the Labour Party base.  Political imperative dictated that Party leader Tony Blair could 
not ignore this segment of the party when drawing up his Cabinet.  Preferring not to 
assign Short, a strong-minded figure to the more powerful domestic Cabinet positions, 
he “specially created” a Cabinet position for development.15  “Serendipitous” is how one 
observer described the ways political interests at the time aligned with the interests of 
development policy.  The creation of a Cabinet level position was ultimately dictated by 
the need for political compromise with a vocal, influential, energetic and independent 
minded MP representing an important segment of the Labour Party.  While Short was 
not a development expert, she brought clarity of purpose and political confidence to the 
new ministry.  
While Short’s personality and seniority in the Labour Party were important determinants 
of DFID’s success, there is perhaps too much made of her influence and too little of the 
political environment governing the times and Robin Cook’s critical championship of a 
separate ministry.  This was the first Labour government in 18 years and the 
Government was “walking on water that carried through into a kind of confidence in the 
Government as a whole, and DFID was an example of this.”  DFID was given the gift of 
political time and space to build a long-term agenda rather than navigate short-term 
political pressures.  This was backed by strong support for a new approach to 
                                                 
14 A cabinet member in the UK Government is referred to as a Secretary of State, while Ministers of State 
hold non-cabinet portfolios. 
15 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/3627156/A-peculiar-sort-of-sacrifice.html (Accessed 
April 28, 2010) 
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development by Prime Minister Tony Blair and then Chancellor of the Exchequer,16 
Gordon Brown.  It was also marked by willingness on the part of senior FCO officials, 
particularly the Permanent Secretary responsible for ODA-UK, to accommodate the 
extraction of development policy from its offices.  This support of elite advocates is 
important when considering how Short carried out such an ambitious programme of 
change within DFID.    
NORWAY 
 
Prior to re-organizing in 2004, the Norwegian aid system was constituted by three main 
actors.  The first of these, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) had de jure responsibility 
for all development assistance, although de facto it handled only the multilateral and 
humanitarian assistance portfolios.  A Minister of Foreign Affairs and a Minister of 
International Development and Human Rights both presided over the MFA, the latter 
having responsibility for development and humanitarian policy within the MFA.17  The 
second actor was the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD). As a 
technical directorate administratively separate from the MFA, NORAD was expected to 
implement MFA policies and strategies.  Embassies, organizational actors distinct from 
the MFA, were the third set of actors critically involved in development assistance in the 
pre-2004 period.  Some embassies reported to the MFA in Oslo, while others (mainly in 
countries where development comprised the bulk of foreign policy activity) reported to 
NORAD.  In NORAD-run embassies, ambassadors were appointed by the MFA although 
accountable to NORAD. 
While NORAD was a specialized autonomous agency from the MFA with its own 
Director General, budget and reporting lines prior to 2004, it was still legally subordinate 
to the MFA.  In this, it shared some of the same ambiguity over its status as CIDA, the 
latter having independent ministerial status while still legally subordinate to the Canadian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) via an order-in-council 
dating from 1968 (Morrison, 1998: 63).  At the same time, NORAD’s autonomy also 
paralleled that of a Crown Corporation in Canada or a Quasi-Autonomous Non-
                                                 
16 Chancellor of the Exchequer is a Cabinet position equivalent to Canada’s Minister of Finance. 
17 The Canadian Cabinet can also include Ministers without authority over a separate Ministry, as 
in the case of the Cabinet position titled “Leader of the Government in the House of Commons”. 
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Governmental Organization (QUANGO) in the UK.18  Moreover, while the division of 
labour between the MFA and NORAD was supposed to distinguish between strategic 
policy development and administrative execution respectively, in practice things were 
more complex.  Notwithstanding its formal accountability to the MFA, prior to 2004 
NORAD effectively served both the policy and administrative functions of an 
autonomous bilateral development agency.   
Against this organizational backdrop, there were three main drivers of re-organization.  
First, the Norwegian Government committed itself to the global policy consensus around 
poverty reduction that had emerged at the turn of the millennium as exemplified in 
various policy statements like the Millennium Development Goals, the Monterrey 
Consensus on Financing Development and the Comprehensive Development 
Framework.  This consensus centered the development community around an aid 
recipient’s national plans to eradicate poverty (Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers), the 
plans a product of wide consultation with domestic stakeholders.  Donors were to align 
themselves around these country-owned plans, in harmony with each other and using 
new instruments like budget support and multi-donor programming to achieve the 
country’s long term vision.  Performance measurement systems gave countries freedom 
to manage and coordinate their development efforts, although any future support was 
conditional on the achievement of tangible results.  For many donors, including Norway, 
this new global policy consensus justified new organizational structures, funding 
instruments and skill sets.  Secondly, wider public sector modernization in Norway 
sought to simplify government responsibilities, decentralize service delivery and reduce 
overlap.  The pressures for reform in Norway did not come from a new Government, as 
in the case of the UK, but from the need to conform to pressures for administrative 
reform.   Thirdly, and less recognized perhaps (certainly in the official record), is the 
desire for political control by the Minister of Development at the time, Hilde Frafjord 
Johnson.  Born in Tanzania to a Norwegian missionary, Johnson was appointed Minister 
                                                 
18 Directorates were the bureaucratic products of changes occurring in Norwegian political-administrative 
systems of the nineteenth century, where professional bodies demanded agencies outside ministries 
handle the technical tasks of government (Christensen, 2003: 163–164). In later years, directorates were 
eventually justified as a way to hive off specialized expertise from the duties of governing. In the 1970s, 
decentralization and devolving authority to subordinate institutions became a favoured policy as new 
tasks and policies over-burdened the political administrative elite.  From this history springs a strong 
Norwegian tradition of separating political decision-making in the Stortinet (Parliament) from 
administrative planning (Ministries) and administrative execution (Directorates).  
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of Development (representing the Christian Democrats) in 1997, and again in 2001.  She 
exhibited considerable interest in development issues, an early champion of the Utstein 
Group, an informal group of female development ministers from Germany, the 
Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom supporting the poverty reduction 
paradigm. 19  Yet, prior to 2004 she was essentially a Minister of Development without an 
organization to minister given the de facto independence of NORAD from the MFA.    
The policy unit within NORAD was a particular bone of contention given the MFA was 
supposed to handle all policy related matters.  Interviewees almost unanimously agreed 
that the new Minister desired an administrative reform that would give her greater power 
over NORAD, power that she could use to advance the global consensus on poverty 
reduction.  Just as in the UK, demand from the highest political levels for a new 
development vision allied with governing political interests to create a powerful incentive 
for administrative reform. 
                                                 
19 In 2003, the Centre for Global Development awarded the Utstein Group an award for fostering global 
commitment to development. 
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DIFFERENT PATHS TO PERFORMANCE 
 
 
 
Assessing donor performance is a tricky business.  Most would agree that assessing 
individual donor performance via their contribution to reducing poverty would be the 
ideal way to proceed.  This is a tall order if one considers that poverty reduction is a 
complex public good produced by multiple actors, and that there is no methodologically 
robust way to establish clear causality between donors characteristics, interventions 
and poverty reduction.  There are considerable difficulties with the dependent variable 
called “performance”.20  
While Canada, Norway and the UK were compared against the main quantitative 
variables likely to be associated with improved poverty reduction in Section 2, this 
section takes a different approach to answering the question of what contributes to 
donor performance.  We assume that the perceptions of performance by key external 
stakeholders are a key proxy for donors’ actual performance, just as the way a survey of 
experts that rates the good governance of a country is also a valid, if subjective, 
measure of that country’s quality of government.  Understanding the policy processes 
that contribute to the perception of performance by trans-national, state and civil society 
constituencies can make sense of the relative performance of the UK and Norway.  This 
is another way of saying that donor legitimacy among its key constituencies is an 
important alternative way to assess its performance.  It should also be recognized, 
however, that obtaining legitimacy can actually be a means to enhance future 
performance because perceptions do have tangible consequences for organizations, 
including the ability to secure resources, to recruit staff and to direct policy and 
programmes in certain directions.  In other words, subjective assessment of current 
performance by key constituencies can be a driver of future realized performance.  By 
assessing donor legitimacy among key stakeholders, we can therefore also evaluate the 
robustness of the UK and Norwegian models.  Against this backdrop, this section 
considers the different paths taken by the UK and Norway to their current status as 
success stories amongst the donor community, while also suggesting that both face 
important challenges in the coming years. 
                                                 
20 For a discussion of these problems, see (de Bruijn, 2007; Harford & Klein, 2004; March & Sutton, 1997; 
Moynihan, 2008; Radin, 2006; Townley, 1997). 
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THE UNITED KINGDOM 
THE EARLY TREND-SETTING YEARS  
Following DFID’s creation in 1997, a number of initiatives took place that established 
the Department’s legitimacy amongst international and domestic stakeholders. First, 
DFID became more than simply a separate development ministry that brought 
together both policy and administrative functions relating development; it also became 
an independent ministry. By independence is meant having the freedom to act and 
exercise authority and discretion on development policy within Government, the 
bounds of this independence drawn by the scope of Government policy.  This 
distinction between separateness and independence is critical as having a distinct 
organizational structure does not by definition guarantee independence of thought 
and of action.  As per Labour’s election manifesto, DFID was liberated from the 
influence of interest groups like “the big project contractors, the high-profile NGOs, 
the over-exposed bankers, the under-exposed consultants, all of whom played a 
valuable part in transferring know-how to developing countries but all of whom had 
grown accustomed to a share of the cake” (Vereker, 2002: 137).  These interest 
groups were the early losers of the shift to a more independent minded department.  
Secondly, DFID aligned itself with the global movement to eradicate poverty that was 
emerging at the time, agreeing to the 1996 International Development Targets 
(IDTs), the precursor to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  Clare Short 
believed these targets provided clarity of purpose for the fledgling department, 
orienting discussions with the Treasury and with the FCO about DFID’s new roles 
and responsibilities.  Buoyed by the supportive environment of the Utstein Group, 
Short also rallied the male- and finance-dominated World Bank Board to refocus their 
own work around the IDTs.21  Internationally, Short’s championship of the IDTs, and 
subsequently the MDGs, enhanced both her and the UK’s reputation within the global 
community of development actors.  Thirdly, within six months of its establishment 
DFID released a White Paper on International Development.  The White Paper 
represented a strong Government endorsement for the new department and signaled 
the scope of a new policy mandate. 
                                                 
21 http://www.odi.org.uk/events/mdgs_midpoint/10jul07/index.html  (Accessed April 15, 2010) 
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The new Department for International Development (DFID) has the 
aim—reflecting the theme of this White Paper—of contributing to the 
elimination of poverty in poorer countries, not just through its bilateral 
and multilateral development programmes, but through working 
collaboratively with other government departments to promote 
consistency and coherence in policies affecting their development 
(Department for International Development, 1997: 20) 
DFID could now claim to captain UK development policy in Government, acquiring all the 
challenges that came with such authority (Lockwood, Mulley, Jones et al., 2010).  It was 
tapped to be much more than an aid agency, representing the interests of a government-
wide development agenda.  The new ministry was also subject to increased oversight by 
Parliamentarians. While the British executive can easily create a ministry without 
Parliamentary approval, once in existence a new ministry must be subject to scrutiny by 
a separate Select Committee (Burall,White & Blick, 2009: 16-18; White & Dunleavy, 
2010).  The Parliamentary Select Committee on International Development (IDC) was 
thus set up to engage in an ongoing dialogue between a cross-section of 
Parliamentarians and DFID.  Previously, Parliamentary scrutiny of development was 
rare as it fell within the much larger mandate of the Foreign Affairs Committee.   
DFID was blazing new trails in its approach to development both globally and nationally.   
It grew significantly in terms of numbers of staff, introducing fresh faces, many with 
backgrounds in advocacy campaigns, non-governmental organizations, academia and 
the humanitarian sector.  This introduced new ideas into the Department, ideas that 
could be taken forward given the political space and protection offered by senior political 
figures and their trusted advisors who together permitted and welcomed innovation and 
defended controversial positions against detractors in government. DFID was, and still is 
to some extent, the destination of choice for bright new recruits seeking the excitement 
of international work, creative opportunities and the sense of mission of a development 
worker rather than the secure, risk-averse comforts of the civil service.  In these early 
days, many observers remarked, other Whitehall ministries considered DFID a renegade 
department, one that had removed aid as a tool servicing the vested interests of the 
state and had created a culture where “there was a sense we could do anything.”  In the 
view of other government departments, having such open possibilities earned DFID the 
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moniker of “the NGO in Government.” Yet, this did little to dissipate enthusiasm for the 
fledgling Ministry amongst the Executive or the IDC.   
BECOMING THE WORLD’S BEST DEVELOPMENT AGENCY 
If the previous era can be described as DFID’s coming of age, the period between 
2002–2005 cemented DFID’s reputation for excellence among the trans-national and 
domestic civil society communities. This was most noticeable in the lead up to the 
2005 G8 Gleneagles Summit, where the UK internationally championed the cause of 
poverty eradication in Africa.  Prior to this event, Clare Short had also successfully 
steered a global consensus on the MDGs and a second debt deal for developing 
countries.  While Short had never been “starry-eyed” about NGOs, DFID actively 
leveraged this global activity and international goodwill to cultivate domestic civil society 
stakeholders supportive of the Department’s work.  One particularly successful strategy 
include “reverse lobbying,” where DFID quietly lobbied civil society actors in order to 
ensure itself of constituencies that could push agendas further than it could, a technique 
effectively used in the “Make Poverty History” campaign.  The civil society community 
also supplied the Government with advisors who could champion development policy 
from within, including Justin Forsyth a former Oxfam Director of Campaigns and Policy 
who Tony Blair brought into Number 10 to advise him on African development.  A win-
win situation resulted as close relations with civil society enhanced public support for 
DFID and also ensured a transparent and robust development policy.  
DFID’s global championship of “a country led model of development” is also cited as 
an important driver of its corporate performance, one that again appealed to 
transnational and civil society actors advocating the principles of country ownership, 
long-range strategic consultative planning by aid recipients, harmonization among 
donors and alignment with aid recipients, the use of flexible financing via 
programmatic instruments, and aid allocation to poor well-governed countries.   
Placing the aid recipient at the centre of DFID’s work involved having more staff 
working at field level (almost doubling field staff between 1997 and 2006 (OECD, 2006: 
55)), increasing delegated responsibility and encouraging more sophisticated 
understandings of country-level politics in programmes and policies (Unsworth, 
2008).  The role of headquarters staff was increasingly defined in terms of supporting 
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field offices in a form of “backward mapping” higher level organizational priorities 
according to needs at the frontlines (Elmore, 1979).  
The (2002) International Development Act also garnered praise for DFID.  While 
DFID’s political commitment to poverty reduction pre-dated the promulgation of the 
Act, the (2002) Act formalized this commitment by legally mandating22 DFID to 
expenditures that were “likely to contribute to poverty reduction” and had the explicit 
purpose of furthering sustainable development (broadly defined as lasting 
development) or promoting human welfare.  While the Act does not explicitly forbid 
the tying of aid or aid that furthers foreign policy, trade or national security concerns, 
it helps ensure that these priorities do not overwhelm the development agenda 
(Burall,White & Blick, 2009: 16-17, 21, 25; Lockwood et al., 2010: 69).  The UK act 
seals into law the mission of poverty reduction as the legal frame of reference for 
DFID’s work, an important standard against which Parliament adjudicates the 
Department’s performance.23  But as many pointed out, the Act was only valuable 
because it was accompanied by the strong political motivations of an Executive that 
had pushed for and promoted its principles.   
With reforms appealing to multiple stakeholders, external praise for DFID grew.  The 
UK Hansard report for July 20, 2005 cites the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State for International Development quoting the Canadian Institute of International 
Affairs statement that DFID was now “the best development agency in the world.”24 
The C.D. Howe Institute also heaped praise on DFID as an exemplar donor (Goldfarb 
& Tapp, 2006).  In the UK, national observers of government also rated DFID as the 
top performing department.  Yet, such praise emerged alongside growing uncertainty 
surrounding DFID’s role in Iraq, the eventual source of Short’s resignation from the 
post of Secretary of State for International Development in May 2003.25  DFID’s 
international reputation for excellence institutionalized itself alongside mounting 
                                                 
22 A legislative mandate provides legal authorities for public expenditure that are defined and approved by 
Parliament. 
23 The Act designates DFID as the lead ministry for carrying out this legal mandate, even if the wording 
refers to the Secretary of State in generic terms (OECD, 2008a: 5) 
24 UK Hansard, July 20, 2005.  
25 http://www.thesamosa.co.uk/index.php/comment-and-analysis/politics/232-short-shrift-rewriting-history-at-
the-iraq-inquiry.html (Retrieved April 5, 2010) 
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domestic concern within other government departments over DFID’s role in failed 
and fragile states (Lockwood et al., 2010: 69).    
With the strength of DFID’s legitimacy occurring against a backdrop of stable 
political leadership and a growing budget, the Department had the space “to try 
things out and take risks” by “looking at new ideas and reward[ing] those ideas in 
terms of visibility and informal incentives.”  The levels of trust engendered in DFID 
permitted operational flexibility to “break all the Treasury rules,” including the ability 
to make ten year budget commitments despite a three-year budget cycle, increased 
delegated authority to field offices, to embrace risk and innovation as an 
opportunity for a greater returns, and to engage in situations where the obstacles to 
poverty alleviation are more political than technical.  The legitimacy of DFID among 
the Executive, the international community, Parliament and domestic civil society 
collectively secured the Department’s independence, providing it with engagement 
opportunities not otherwise afforded to its peers. 
STANDARDIZATION AND CONSOLIDATION IN WHITEHALL 
One interviewee suggested that Douglas Alexander, the last Secretary of State for 
International Development under the previous Labour Government, stated that while “he 
believed DFID was one of the best development agencies in the world, his objective was 
to make DFID a great development ministry.”  This alludes to some disappointment 
around DFID’s performance as a Whitehall department.  Yet, since 2000, DFID‘s 
performance has been assessed against Public Service Agreement targets favourably, 
with the Treasury growing DFID’s budget allocation accordingly.26  Two rounds of 
Cabinet Office assessments of DFID’s capability have been generous in their praise, 
with the recent review identifying the department as both internationally admired and 
highly performing (Cabinet Office, 2009: 6).  How then to interpret the desire to make 
DFID an even better development ministry?  
At one level, this can be understood in terms of the global community’s desire to see 
tangible development results after the international commitments and resources devoted 
                                                 
26 Of course, this may reflect weaknesses with both the setting of PSA targets and departments’ abilities 
to reach them (James, 2004). 
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to development in the last decade.  Domestic fiscal pressures to cut public expenditures 
are also a strong motivator.  DFID is only one of a handful of government departments to 
have its programming budget ring-fenced from cuts, although it is still being asked to 
achieve government-wide administrative efficiency savings targets. This protection of 
development spending can perhaps be explained by a widespread cross-party 
commitment to achieve the 0.7% ODA/GNI target by 2013.  Such exceptionalism has put 
DFID “under pressure” to demonstrate its efficiency, impact and value for money 
(International Development Select Committee, 2009).  Scrutiny by the Public Accounts 
Committee and the National Audit Office is growing in line with growth in DFID’s budget 
and profile.  There is a slow and steady movement from a “trust me” culture to a “show 
me” culture that perhaps threatens the flexibility, openness and innovation that has come 
to characterize DFID.    
At another level, DFID’s desire to improve is partly borne out of a need to cultivate greater 
legitimacy among other government departments that continue to view it with suspicion.  
DFID cannot afford to keep being seen as ‘the NGO down the road’, as 
it has been caricatured within other parts of government—perceptions 
can matter as much as reality.  Instead, in the words of one 
interviewee, the department must become more of a ‘Whitehall warrior’. 
(Lockwood et al., 2010: 10) 
Some suggest DFID has failed to captain development policy in the ways set out in the 
1997 White Paper, notwithstanding efforts to build inter-departmental alliances and strides 
made in embedding the development agenda across Whitehall.27  While progress on 
“joined-up government” appears to have been made on the trade, climate change and 
conflict files, a recent report by the Institute of Public Policy Research claims DFID has 
sought to protect its poverty credentials and international reputation by retreating into a 
narrowly defined aid agency role rather than championing policy coherence more widely 
(Lockwood et al., 2010: 71).  Interviews with DFID staff suggest the organization is now 
aware that it cannot exploit its independence to isolate itself from the hard decisions and 
policy tradeoffs to be made across Whitehall in the coming years, particularly under a 
                                                 
27 For example, a joint FCO-DFID unit established to manage the UK’s relations with Sudan won an 
award for best Central Government team in the public service (Barder, 2005: 46). 
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Conservative-led coalition government that has expressed interest in directing a greater 
percentage of aid to security-related agendas (Conservative Party, 2009).    
Overall in the UK, we have the story of a department and a development policy that has 
garnered considerable international and civil society kudos.  Parliament and the 
Executive have been important champions within the state apparatus, although other 
government departments remain noticeable detractors from the DFID cheerleading 
squad.  Conscious of the limited support from departmental colleagues, DFID has 
sought to cultivate trust from this quarter, fully aware that this backing will be an 
important determinant on and measure of its success in the coming years. 
 
NORWAY 
ADAPTING AND INTEGRATING FOR COUNTRY-LED DEVELOPMENT 
If the UK is viewed as a donor that has set global policy trends in recent years, Norway 
is seen to be a donor that robustly obeys them.  While Norway’s development activities 
have historically been both progressive and innovative,28 in the last decade it has not 
achieved the same international reputation as a bilateral donor that DFID under Clare 
Short did.  At the turn of the millennium, Norway was responding to demands for a new 
kind of governance structure for its development programme and as a good global 
citizen, Norway needed to demonstrate that it was prepared to conform to global 
standards and work in the new ways demanded of it.  While many suggested that the 
political desire for administrative control on the part of Minister of Development Hilde 
Frafjord Johnson propelled the decision to integrate NORAD within the MFA, it could 
equally be justified as an adaptive governance reform to the global paradigm of country-
led development.  
                                                 
28 For example, Norway championed the concept of recipient responsibility long before the donor 
community converged on “country ownership” (Berg Alfsen, 2008: 22).   
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Against the backdrop of this new development policy environment and the need for 
Norwegian legitimacy within it, the Government commissioned an evaluation of 
Norwegian aid architecture in 2003.  This evaluation surmised that notwithstanding 
Norway’s strong international commitment, administrative efficiency, overlap and 
fragmentation in its national governance systems remained significant challenges 
(ECON Centre for Economic Analysis, 2003: ii).  Unconvinced by the merits of the 
current tripartite division of labour between NORAD, MFA and the embassies, the 
ECON study unqualifiedly recommended a “unified and integrated” administration for 
Norwegian development activities.  It outlined two options for doing so.  The first 
proposed a separate and strengthened NORAD with greater authority and a fuller role 
for both policy and implementation, citing Sweden and Canada as inspirations. The 
second option involved the full integration of NORAD into the MFA, along the lines of 
the Dutch and Danish systems where ministries of foreign affairs are lead departments 
for development. 
Given that Minister of Development Johnson had been seeking greater political control 
over NORAD, she must have ruled out the creation of a stronger NORAD almost 
immediately.  Nevertheless, she was also forced to recognize the implausibility of full 
integration given the existing size of the MFA.  Moreover, this impulse went counter to 
the public sector modernization effort underway at the time that encouraged central 
ministries to become leaner rather than larger.  Johnson ultimately chose a hybrid 
governance solution that was not part of the evaluation study’s recommendations.  
Policy power was consolidated within the MFA, while responsibilities for implementing 
the country-led model started with the embassies. NORAD was left with responsibility for 
technical advisory work, quality assurance and evaluation, all of which were meant to 
supplement the administrative work of MFA and embassies. NORAD’s policy function 
was clipped as it lost both personnel and authority to the MFA and embassies.  This re-
organization of the relations governing embassies, NORAD and the MFA expanded and 
consolidated the latter’s position and power.  Most interviewees described the MFA as 
the most powerful ministry in Government, dwarfing all others in terms of size and 
prestige.  The MFA’s position is largely explained in terms of Norway’s reliance on good 
external relations as a small country.  Its trade interests, its lack of former colonies upon 
which to project a legacy, a history of missionary work and the need for an international 
identity as a non-member of the European Union, all make foreign policy a salient 
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domestic concern.  The MFA acquires its status as a legitimate heavyweight in inter-
departmental politics accordingly.  The 2004 re-organization reinforced rather than 
threatened this existing bureaucratic configuration. 
The reactions from civil society groups to this shift of functions were, on the whole, 
positive.  The country-led model still relied on Norwegian NGOs for project execution, 
even if continued reliance potentially undermined efforts to reduce aid fragmentation and 
dispersion (OECD, 2005: 63).  Longer-term funding arrangements with NGOs grew 
rather than shrank.  Under the changes, NGOs gained policy and advocacy work as a 
new and increasingly important work stream.  Continued government support for 
Norwegian civil society is explained by historically strong public support for NGOs, the 
combined result of the country’s missionary tradition, the history of the Norwegian 
Socialist solidaristic movement that supported the independence of colonized African 
states, and by Norway’s strong corporatist-pluralist state traditions, where interest 
groups have a high standing in decision-making, policy development and implementation 
(Christensen, 2003: 180; Kishigami, 2006).       
DEVELOPMENT POLICY AS FOREIGN POLICY  
Norway’s development policy is not underpinned by any specific piece of legislation as in 
the UK, but is the result of the government’s policy platform, its addresses to the Storting 
and published White Papers (OECD, 2008b: 20).  The election in 2005 of a coalition 
government made up of Labour, Socialist Left and Centre Parties marked a subtle but 
important shift in policy stance, one where shorter-term foreign policy interests 
encroached upon a country-focused development policy.  This change finds explicit 
mention in the Government’s 2009 White Paper.   
This white paper represents a step forward in the process of integrating 
development policy and foreign policy. The central aim of our foreign policy is 
to safeguard Norwegian interests. In development policy, the focus is on 
poor countries’ interests. However, these interests coincide in many areas. 
(Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009: 10) 
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Minister of Development and Environment,29 Erik Solheim, from the Socialist Left 
Party, 30 presided over what is widely acknowledged as the use of foreign aid to service 
domestic political priorities.  The extent to which foreign policy and development 
interests coincide to deliver mutually reinforcing benefits is a matter of some contention. 
Many examples cited by interviewees suggested that twinning these interests 
subordinated development concerns to foreign policy ones.  For example, aid has been 
a vehicle to advance Norway’s foreign relations, cultivating soft power to advance its 
policies on NATO and the Arctic, secure commercial contracts for Norwegian 
companies to extract natural resources in Angola, as well as a means for securing 
employment and policy influence within the multilateral system.   
Internationally, this explicit shift in the rationale for Norwegian aid occurred without 
widespread consternation.  Despite a more strategic positioning of development as 
“high politics”, Norway maintains a global reputation for being a generous ‘team player’ 
willing to conform and champion the “low politics” of poverty reduction.  Its international 
legitimacy rests on its past record of peace-building and global diplomacy, promoting 
human rights, humanitarian relief and gender-related issues.  Currently, Norway 
supports numerous jointly funded donor initiatives, finances a large number of 
earmarked multilateral trust funds at the United Nations and World Bank and is an 
advocate of budget support. Yet, it would be foolish to downplay Norway’s strong 
financial commitments for global development as a source of its strong global brand.  
Multilateral contributions have increased in absolute terms between 2005–2009, 
consistently comprising over 50% of total ODA.31  Many interviewees suggested 
Norway has been buying influence on the world stage and that this is gaining the 
country “influence larger than the size of the country and its investments.” 
Amongst domestic constituencies in civil society, servicing foreign policy via 
development policy is more a matter of comment than a focus for consternation. 
Foreign policy concerns have been heaped on top of existing solidaristic 
development priorities, deferring difficult tradeoffs as more controversial initiatives 
are funded via the annual budget increment rather than at the expense of other 
                                                 
29 Solheim assumed responsibilities for the separate Environment Ministry in 2007. 
30 2005 was the first time the Socialist Left had been elected to Government. 
31 This includes multi-bilateral funding.  See section 2.  
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initiatives.32  The increment, however, has been large given the country’s expanding 
revenue base, with Norway’s ODA budget increasing by 35% between 2005 and 
2009 (NORAD, in-house).  
As increasing oil revenues bolster the development assistance budget in real 
terms, the Norwegian development co-operation system does not have the 
same constraints as many other donors, and is able both to maintain current 
activities and absorb new ones. (OECD, 2008b: 22) 
Funding for NGOs has increased in absolute terms, although it has been relatively 
constant at 21% of total Norwegian ODA and 30% of total bilateral assistance (NORAD, 
in-house). The view that NGOs are more efficient than the state in delivering services in-
country is widely held in Norway, which ensures relatively consistent support for NGOs. 
Norway also provides 10% of all NGO finance to local NGOs in recipient countries 
(NORAD, in-house).33 In addition to this financial support, relations with NGOs have 
benefitted from considerable moral support notwithstanding greater use of development 
policy to service foreign policy objectives.  There is increasing reliance on a ‘revolving-
door’ of employment between NGOs and the Government, encouraging good relations 
across the sectors.  Overall, a nationalistically oriented development policy has not come 
at the expense of the Norwegian government’s reputation among either civil society or 
the global policy community, with neither stakeholder having seen a fall in their budgets 
or a phasing-out of their programming.  An expansion in ODA commitments does seem 
to have deferred debate over the shifting rationale for aid-giving in Norway. 
Within the realm of domestic politics, the politicization of development policy has further 
enhanced the MFA’s power vis-a-vis other state bodies.  Since 2005, approximately 65% 
of total ODA is controlled by the MFA while 20% is the responsibility of embassies.  This 
leaves NORAD and other government institutions with little financial clout to challenge 
the dominance of  current development thinking.  Nor is it clear that other state actors 
                                                 
32 This is certainly not the case in Canada where fiscal retrenchment has required difficult tradeoffs to be 
made within the aid programme and looks set to continue to do so. See 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/solving-our-problems-on-the-backs-of-the-
poor/article1516235/ (Accessed April 30, 2010) 
33 This 10% figure is a part of the 34.1% figure in Table 8, which represents local indigenous NGOs as 
well as international and regional NGOs. 
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would have any mandate to challenge this shift given Government White Papers are 
explicit in their desire for a more politicized and partisan development policy. This is 
reinforced, or perhaps the result of, convergence of views between the Minister of 
Development and Environment and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.  The MFA’s main 
concern about this shift relates to the growing administrative burden that accompanies 
such an expansion of policy interests.  The risk of fragmentation results as new lines of 
work are added to older lines.  Embassies too seem to be suffering the consequences of 
“policy overload from Oslo.”  To some degree, this has been countered by a 
recentralization of responsibilities back to the MFA in Oslo.  Overload within the MFA, in 
turn, has meant NORAD has come to “fill the gaps in capacity.”  This was presumably 
one of the motivations behind returning authority over the Norwegian development NGO 
grant financing window to NORAD (OECD, 2008b: 46).34  
Overall, it would seem the intrusion of foreign policy interests into the country-led 
approach to development has not come at the expense of Norway’s reputation as a 
development actor within either the global development community or domestic civil 
society.  An expanding aid budget appears to have pre-empted consternation, with 
most criticisms directed at the heavy administrative and efficiency costs of policy and 
project dispersion.   
EMERGING FISSURES 
 A number of critical voices are starting to be heard on the subject of Norwegian 
development cooperation.  This is perhaps reflected less at the international level, where 
Norway’s reputation has yet to be seriously tarnished, and more so in the domestic 
political arena.  Uncomfortable questions are starting to be asked about the 
inconsistencies of its development policy, accountability to Parliament and the nature of 
results for poverty reduction that can be expected.  
An emerging concern is the Janus-faced nature of a development policy motivated by 
national interests.  One recent critical commentary has described the current policy 
                                                 
34 NORAD took over the management of development grants to Norweigan NGOs, with the MFA 
maintaining responsibility for grants to humanitarian NGOs and embassies managing grants to local civil 
society actors.  This concurs with MFA’s interest in politically managing the humanitarian portfolio that 
brings with it political visibility.  
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environment in Norway as a case of “doublethink” where the country is deliberately 
avoiding hard policy choices.  Even the OECD has suggested the linkage of between 
and foreign policies in Norway may be leading to “conflict between old and new 
priorities” (OECD, 2008b: 22). 
Many seem to think that they can have a large oil industry and at the same 
time lead the fight against climate change; that they can work in corrupt, 
repressive regimes and still be seen as champions of human rights; that they 
can promote Norwegian business interests in the global economy to the 
same degree as other states but be seen as pioneers of corporate social 
responsibility; and that they can talk about redistributing global wealth while 
their pension fund continues to invest in tax havens.  Overall, Norway has 
lost its ethical niche.  (Curtis, 2010: 5) 
Curtis suggests that Norway’s identity as a donor has been lost as a result of this 
hypocrisy in its development policy.  Whereas the country was closely associated to 
peace-keeping in the 1970s and its heterodox economic models in the heyday of 
neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s, he argues it risks losing this reputation as it has 
not offered “a big idea to give to the world” (Curtis, 2010: 25).  Unlike DFID that has had 
a clear definition of the kind of development policy it stands for, Norway seems to still be 
searching for an identity that reconciles its strategic interests with its historical 
reputations for altruism and internationalism.  The parallels with Canada, recently 
accused of “squandering its reputation” internationally, are striking.35 
These are also growing concerns expressed about the growing power of the MFA at 
the expense of Parliamentary accountability. Their criticisms are noteworthy given 
Norway’s political tradition is built upon relatively light Parliamentary oversight, where 
politicians concentrate on their political functions, respect the values and practice of 
civil servants, make decisions based on the norms of consensus and collectivity and 
hold fast to the rule of ministerial responsibility (Christensen, 2003: 173).  In Norway, 
the custom is that “foreign policy is run by Government and Government doesn’t 
                                                 
35 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/fowler-blasts-ottawas-inaction-in-africa/article1514913/ 
(Accessed April 30, 2010) 
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need to [tell] Parliament anything.”  In such a trusting environment, many within the 
domestic development policy community are still concerned that “the MFA is 
becoming a state within a state.” Calls by an independent Commission on Policy 
Coherence for the MFA to report regularly to the Storting on the effects and results of 
Norwegian development policies hint at the concern about the MFA’s openness and 
accountability (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008).  
The carrot of an expanding development budget in Norway can only keep criticisms at 
bay for so long.  Not only are changes in budget priorities possible, the modest 
achievement of development ‘results’ that justified aid spending is sure to raise alarm 
bells among Norwegians themselves.  Increased media reports of corruption in 
Norwegian development projects and the attention garnered by ‘anti-aid’ literatures 
suggest growing aid skepticism from the Norwegian public.  In response, NORAD is now 
reporting on annual ‘results’ via evaluations of key projects and programmes (NORAD, 
2010: 3–4).  In this, the Norwegian trend seems to be converging with the UK’s focus on 
impact in the run up to the 2015 MDG deadline.  
In summary, Norway’s performance seems to largely be secured by its reputation as a 
“team player” at the global level.  The domestic civil society community is also generally 
supportive of the Norwegian aid system, notwithstanding some emerging concerns 
about the contradictions and tensions in twinning its foreign and development policy 
goals.  While the power of the MFA and an expanding aid budget has muted these 
critical voices for the most part, fissures are emerging as a result of growing public 
skepticism over aid’s goals, channels and outcomes and relatively limited accountability 
and involvement of Parliament.  This risks splitting the enviable cross-party support for 
development that has long existed in Norway and eroding long-standing public 
commitment to aid in ways that may become irreversible. 
What are the comparative advantages of each of these models of aid architecture? 
Both countries have continuous and robust support from trans-national and civil society 
communities.  In the UK, a separate DFID became a champion of an independent 
development policy and an important site for inter-departmental negotiations in all 
matters involving developing countries.  Physical separation provided the backdrop for 
initiatives like strengthening country offices, the passage of the IDA Accountability Act 
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and the 2005 G8 Gleneagles Summit, to name but a few.  Intellectual leadership, 
innovation, and risk-taking emerged as sources of the UK’s comparative advantage.  In 
Norway, merging with the MFA provided development policy with more visibility as a 
result of its central place in foreign policy circles.  This translated into greater linkages 
between strategic national domestic priorities, foreign policy objectives and 
development goals.  Against the backdrop of an expanding resource base, Norway 
remains an influential international actor that can respond generously and quickly to 
requests for its assistance.   
The limitations of the UK model seem to be that the level of authority and prominence 
given to DFID antagonized other government departments.  A strong and robust 
development policy also seems to have irked other government departments.  DFID’s 
exceptionalism has now resulted in increased pressure to meet results and efficiency 
savings targets, which in turn seem to reduce its room for innovation and strategic 
discretion.  Meanwhile in Norway, the integration of development policy functions 
within the MFA has expanded that body’s influence and reach, some say at the 
expense of strategic focus, efficiency and public accountability.  While an expanding 
aid budget has kept most criticisms at bay, it is increasingly unclear whether 
maintaining a robust development programme that simultaneously services national 
interests is feasible.  Growing tensions have emerged from integrating development 
and foreign policy concerns within the MFA, suggesting dual humane and realist 
motivations for aid-giving are not so much mutually reinforcing as zero-sum in nature. 
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LESSONS FOR CANADA  
 
 
The lessons to be gleaned for Canadian development cooperation from the Norwegian 
and British experiences fall into four broad categories.  First, there are lessons for 
Canada at the level of the broad strategy it chooses to adopt to advance an agenda of 
renewal.  Secondly, the experiences of Norway and Britain offer important guidance for 
the debate over the appropriate governance structure for administering development.   In 
addition, there are lessons for strengthening development policy processes.  And finally, 
there is direction for addressing micro-level organizational issues within donor 
organizations.   Although the UK and Norway achieved their performance against an 
expanding aid budget, the lessons below require no additional financing.  This is not to 
say that development finance is not an important driver of donor performance in Norway 
and the UK; on the contrary both countries achieved their reputations for success via the 
autonomy and credibility that financing provided.  In this regard, it is disheartening to 
hear that the Canadian aid budget is once again at the frontlines of government 
cutbacks.36  Nevertheless, the purpose here is to identify key areas for improvement that 
extend beyond budgetary instruments.  All of these lessons are summarized in Table 10 
at the end of this section. 
STRATEGY FOR RENEWAL 
 
In both the UK and Norway, governance reform emerged from a clear political will to 
substantiate a political vision expressed by senior political figures.  Re-organization 
requires ambitious objectives and the political leadership to achieve them, particularly at 
the early stages of reform.  In the UK, Robin Cook, Labour opposition critic on Foreign 
Affairs up to 1997, committed the Party to stop servicing national interests with the 
foreign aid budget via the creation of a separate ministry with independence over 
development policy.  In Norway, a political vision of a programme centred on country-led 
development led the incumbent Minister of Development to demand greater oversight of 
policy direction within the MFA.  Choices of aid architecture will always be subordinate to 
                                                 
36 See http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/solving-our-problems-on-the-backs-of-the-
poor/article1516235/  (Accessed April 30, 2010) 
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high-level political commitments and leadership.  As one DFID staff member 
acknowledged: “The political ambition comes first; there is no point in having all the 
capability pulled together in DFID if the purpose was to run an old fashioned aid 
programme.”  There are no easy answers in the absence of political vision and 
leadership as no governance structure can substitute for these critical ingredients for 
donor performance.  Nevertheless, it is possible to exogenously foster these, for 
example, by encouraging citizens to articulate compelling visions for development policy 
around which political and public support can be harnessed.  
A related point to consider is that political leadership does not require strong public 
support for development at the outset.  Robin Cook’s championship of development was 
not built on the backs of opinion polls but out of a principled commitment.  Although 
development policy featured insignificantly in the 1997 election campaign, the Labour 
Government is recognized for having cultivated a strong development administration 
with a global reputation on development policy, so much so that development issues 
displayed themselves much more prominently on the recent electoral campaign trail as 
both a record of Labour’s achievement and as a matter for policy debate.37  Expressed 
political commitment can foster public support for development and does not always 
need to trail it.  As Clare Short acknowledged, this  required an investment of political 
capital, one that involved struggles against vested interests and the status quo (Short, 
2009).  Once public support has been engendered, however, it can acquire political 
durability.  For example, in the recent UK general election, all the major parties sought 
to display their development credentials, including legislating the 0.7% ODA/GNI 
commitment and maintaining DFID’s status as a separate ministry, suggesting that 
concerns about global equity and poverty had arrived within the political mainstream. 
Whilst re-merging DFID with FCO is possible with the stroke of the pen, it appears to 
have become politically unpalatable to suggest doing so.38   
                                                 
37  See http://www.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/5922663/overseas-aid-could-be-a-tory-winner-in-conlib-
fights.thtml; http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/leading_article/article6985486.ece; 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jan/12/cameron-slum-dogma-aid-ideology  
(All accessed May 2, 2010) 
38 (Conservative Party, 2009) 
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Political interests of the day are the single most important influence on the choice of aid 
architecture. For example, the imperative of giving a strong personality like Clare Short a 
Cabinet position prompting the creation a separate department for development, or Hilde 
Johnson’s desire for authority over NORAD resulting in its amalgamation within the 
MFA.  Often political interests can be serviced by championing global development 
policy norms, where such championship advances standing internationally and among 
domestic NGO constituencies.  This has certainly been the case in the UK, where 
politicians received kudos for leading global  development policy innovation or in Norway 
where political strength derives from active and generous support of extant global 
development policies.  
Having a clear, coherent and stable political vision for a development programme is also 
an important source of comparative advantage.  Canada needs to move away from 
aiming to be “the world’s best agency” to actually defining for itself “what it means to be 
the world’s best agency” given its own particular historical trajectory and political 
evolution. This vision need not be driven by pure altruism.  Foreign aid sits at the 
intersection of humane and realist rationales and managing the conflict between them is 
an important strategic concern because when a program tilts towards one of them, 
countervailing forces are triggered that work against it (Black, 2007: 199; Pratt, 2000).  In 
fact, it is almost certain that humane approaches will eventually come under pressure by 
realist rationales for aid that serve (or at least take into account) national interests, as 
the UK and Norway cases illustrate in their later years.  Maintaining “parallel” realist and 
humane rationales as in Norway can only be sustained by an expanding aid budget, 
although even there it cannot prevent growing public skepticism as contradictions 
emerge.  In the UK, there are some who suggest the clarity of its humane internationalist 
political vision is a significant advantage, so long as DFID actively defends this vision 
from attack rather than conservatively ring-fencing it to prevent its further dilution  
(Lockwood et al., 2010: 16).  The point here is that any successful political vision needs 
to be unambiguous about where it stands on the humane/realist continuum, honest 
about the tradeoffs that need to be made in reconciling the two rationales for aid and 
ready to engage in the good fight against the other when necessary.  If development 
interests are too often sacrificed at the altar of policy coherence as some suggest 
(Brown, forthcoming; Smilie, 2004), this is suggestive of the need for openly accepting 
instances of “dis-jointed government” so that a clear, internally coherent vision of 
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development can emerge.  This does not necessarily privilege an insulated humane 
rationale for development, though it does require strengthening the position of 
development actors at the heart of government to ensure that when tradeoffs are made, 
they are the product of negotiation among partners of relatively equal standing.   
There is also merit in considering how best to engender cross-Party support for 
development by using development policy as a vehicle to unite Canadians to serve a 
nobler cause.  In both Norway and the UK, strong cross-Party support for development 
is the basis for projecting an internationalist humane vision of itself on the global stage.  
In Norway, a country smaller than Canada but with no colonial heritage, a progressive 
international policy is a way to cultivate an identity that would otherwise be lacking while 
in Britain, such a policy is a way to transcend the stains of colonialism.  Moving 
development policy beyond partisan interests is a way to mitigate against domestic 
pressures that can be more easily managed after global external legitimacy is obtained 
(Morrison, 1998: 447).  Linking national unity with the aims of international solidarity in 
development does have a precedent in Canada, often in times of crisis.  The Indian 
Ocean tsunami in 2004 and the Haitian earthquake in 2010 come to mind as instances 
where Canadians moved beyond parochial interests and affiliations and generously 
united in common cause.   Nevertheless, as Morrison (1998) tells us in detail that is 
sometimes painful to read, Canadian development cooperation is a long tale of 
politicians exploiting aid to service ethnic, corporate, geopolitical, regional and linguistic 
interests—in other words as a tool to divide Canadians.  In the current political 
environment, it is the institutionalized association between a progressive development 
policy and the Liberal Party that is particularly debilitating, as it seems to automatically 
discredit many Canadian NGOs, academics and policy avenues in the eyes of a 
Conservative Government.  Nor is it self-evident that Liberals remain the vanguard of a 
humane development policy.39  Ways need to be found to touch the loyal base of all 
political parties with the aims of international solidarity.  This is not necessarily a fool’s 
mission if one considers that in a recent poll, 61% of self-declared Conservatives solidly 
                                                 
39 See http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/fowler-blasts-ottawas-inaction-in-africa/article1514913/ 
(April 30, 2010) 
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support development assistance (OECD, 2007: 27).  The search for bipartisanship on 
Canadian development policy is not beyond the realm of the possible.40 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
 
There is no clear identifiable “good practice” when it comes to questions of aid 
architecture, no ability to link systems of governance to more effective aid.  The only 
recommendation the OECD offers is that development policy and its administrative 
implementation should be integrated in order to “foster complementary relationships and 
synergy by integrating, or at least better coordinating, fragmented systems under one 
strategic umbrella” (OECD, 2008a: 11).  An “integrated” model exists in Norway where 
the MFA and embassies hold overall responsibility for both development policy and its 
administrative execution.  It also exists in the UK where DFID is simultaneously 
responsible for both policy and administrative functions (OECD, 2009a).41  As mentioned 
in the introduction, integration does not occur with an arms’ length Crown corporation 
that remains an implementing agency of government’s development policy, with little 
systematic view over or ability to shape policies.42   
The case studies suggest that achieving integration within a ministry of development can 
safeguard a robust, coherent and independent development policy that can align with 
either altruistic or realist motivations.  In contrast, integration within a ministry of foreign 
affairs offers limited ability to sustainably champion development policies that may 
challenge nationalistic, commercial or geo-political motivations for aid-giving.  If the 
functions of a development agency are liable to evolve and vary—and there are grounds 
to assume as much given organizational functions are partly a product of shifting political 
environments and agendas—an institutional form that can accommodate the widest 
possible range of agency functions makes sense.  If donors’ structural form followed 
their function, forms would need to continuously change in step with changing functions.  
                                                 
40 See http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/minority-governments-are-hobbling-canadian-
foreign-policy/article1516223/  (April 29, 2010) 
41 Canada is listed as an example of the British integrated model, alongside Australia.   
42 A Crown corporation would also not have a Minister in Cabinet, and therefore would not reflect the 
lessons learned from both Norway and the UK’s experience with powerful Ministers of Development 
centrally embedded in Government. Interestingly, Maurice Strong, the first President of CIDA, had initially 
considered a Crown Corporation-like structure for CIDA but dismissed it because it risked reducing 
CIDA’s voice in government (Morrison, 1998: 63). 
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Integrating policy and administrative functions within a ministry of development provides 
a timeless form for multiple and evolving functions.   
What evidence can be harnessed to support this claim?  In Norway, consolidation within 
the MFA has facilitated greater blurring of the lines that distinguish development and 
foreign policy.  This was most acutely felt with the departure of Hilde Johnson.  By 
merging with the MFA, development policy could not offer a countervailing position on 
priorities, tradeoffs and policy coherence debates informed by diplomatic imperatives.  
While an expanding aid budget has permitted the parallel co-existence of concerns and 
streams of activity to date, this occurs at the cost of operational dispersion and rising 
administrative burdens.  In most countries, budget constraints would require strategic 
prioritization and the analysis of tradeoffs.   An autonomous ministry centrally embedded 
in government processes seems better placed at the negotiating table in these 
instances, its distinct status allowing it to maintain an independent vision of development 
and temper countervailing realist ambitions. This is what DFID is now increasingly being 
called upon to do, its physical separation from FCO a source of its strength as a body 
with a systematic view of development that serves as a champion of poverty reduction in 
high-level government negotiations (Shafik, 2006).  An autonomous ministry formally 
charged with development policy and implementation can better respond to shifts in the 
rationale for aid, particularly when the winds are blowing away from strategic geopolitical 
visions towards more selfless internationalist objectives that would otherwise be harder 
to accommodate within a foreign affairs ministry.  While a physically separate 
development ministry is a helpful starting point for a strong and coherent development 
policy, there is a need to secure separation legally as a way to ensure independence. 
Where ministerial authorities lie more in convention than in the letter of the law, as in the 
current case with CIDA, formalizing autonomy of the development portfolio is a good 
starting point to strengthen development policy.  Any effort to strengthen CIDA’s legal 
autonomy needs to be concerned by the history of Canadian interdepartmental relations 
however, where efforts to enhance CIDA’s powers tend to provoke countervailing 
reactions to physically subsume it under Foreign Affairs (Morrison, 1998: 401). 
Integration of policy and administrative functions can also  ensure a Minister in Cabinet 
that gives development issues “greater voice at the tables of power” (Whaites, 1998: 52). 
The seniority of a development minister rests on the political prerogatives of the Prime 
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Minister,43 though the position will almost always have an inferior rank to domestic 
portfolios with more visibility nationally.  A further point to note from the Norwegian 
experience, where the Minister of Development also has responsibility for the 
Environment Ministry, is that dual portfolios can divert the focus of a Minister.   
Accordingly, a senior Cabinet Minister should lead a legally autonomous department for 
international development, with primary responsibility for and sole focus on development 
policy and its coherence across Government.  
Another lesson for Canada emerges from the UK’s experience with a legislated mandate 
specifying DFID’s purpose and functions.  While a legislated mandate can be a valuable 
governance structure to preserve the independence of a development ministry, it must 
be recognized that the 2008 ODA Accountability Act does not serve as a legal mandate 
for CIDA, or any other Government department, in the same way as the 2002 
International Development Act does in the UK.  One reason for this lies in the fact that 
the Canadian Act defines development spending in terms of ODA and natural disaster 
spending, exempting non-ODA spending within the International Assistance Envelope.44  
Not all of CIDA’s activities can be classified within the definition of ODA, in contrast to 
the UK where the Act (2002) covers all DFID’s work.  The wording of the UK Act 
empowers the Secretary of State responsible for DFID to comply with its stipulations in 
all of its work and is the source of a strong cultural orientation for the Department.  In 
contrast, the scope of the Canadian ODA Accountability Act is vast, covering ODA 
expenditures by CIDA, Finance Canada and DFAIT and does not empower CIDA with a 
strong ethos or mandate.  
Claire Short has said on the record that the Canadian Act “seems less stringent than the 
UK Act” (Short, 2009).  The Canadian Act must “ensure that all Canadian official 
development assistance abroad is provided with a central focus on poverty reduction” 
                                                 
43 As one interviewee pointed out, almost no development Minister comes to the development portfolio as 
a senior minister.  A development Minister is either a novice politician “on their way in” or a politician that 
has seen her best days and is “on their way out”.  One can understand the success of Clare Short as a 
Minister “on her way out” of the Labour Party, having been an MP for the 14 years preceding her Cabinet 
appointment.  Similarly, Erik Solheim, Norway’s minister of international development, was a senior figure 
of the Socialist Left and a diplomatic heavyweight, achieving renown for his peace building efforts 
between the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil Tigers in 2002.  Perhaps one lesson to learn then is 
the importance of drawing any potential Minister of Development from the pool of MPs with government 
experience. 
44 http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0710-e.htm#fn7  
(Accessed April 30, 2010) 
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while in the UK, development assistance can only be provided if the Secretary of State is 
“satisfied that the provision of the assistance is likely to contribute to a reduction in 
poverty.”  The difference may appear semantic but it does suggest that impact is a more 
central concern in the UK, while in Canada what matters is the “poverty reduction” 
moniker attached to any activity.  In addition to being likely to have an impact, in the UK 
Act aid must have the purpose of poverty reduction.  In Canada, however, aid must both 
have the purpose of poverty reduction and be provided in a “manner that is consistent 
with Canadian values, Canadian foreign policy, the principles of the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness of March 2, 2005, sustainable development and democracy promotion 
and that promotes international human rights standards.”  The Canadian Act thus legally 
requires ODA to be consistent with foreign policy interests, while the UK Act does not 
stipulate any supplementary conditions on aid spending in line with national values, 
foreign policy priorities or democratic principles.  The UK Act empowers DFID to resist 
pressures to securitize its development assistance spending, for example in Iraq 
(Lockwood et al., 2010: 69), as well as to work in countries where poverty created by 
poor governance is the source of abject need, none of which is possible under the 
Canadian Act.  At the same time, when pushed DFID can accommodate foreign policy 
interests by claiming development assistance is provided for the purpose of sustainable 
development and human welfare and is likely to have an impact on poverty.  Thus the 
wording of the UK Act is both a buffer for DFID to resist pressures to dilute its 
development objectives, but is also flexible enough to accommodate other interests 
when there are sufficient grounds to believe there will be some impact on poverty 
outcomes.  The UK Act rests on a strong political commitment to development, while the 
Canadian Act emerged as a private members bill that eventually achieved cross-party 
support.  The ongoing lack of high-level political commitment to the Act in Canada 
considerably hinders the value of the legislation, with the resultant risk that compliance 
with the Act turns into little more than a ‘box-ticking’ exercise (Brown, forthcoming: 15; 
Morton, 2009).  
A final governance structure that may improve the independence of a development 
program is the creation of a separate Standing Parliamentary Committee on 
International Development (IDC).  Parliamentary involvement via committee activity 
within the House of Commons is not only a way to ensure accountability of the aid 
programme, it is also a means of cultivating a supportive constituency for development.  
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The IDC in the UK is one of the “strongest mechanisms for scrutinizing and influencing 
DFID” (Burall,White & Blick, 2009: 21).  The IDC came to see its primary role as 
positively influencing the ways that DFID both delivers and establishes aid policy.  This 
committee closely examines all reports submitted to Parliament and ensures the 
Government responds to recommendations, bringing an important feedback loop into 
DFID’s relation with Parliament.  It also undertakes its own research reports on key 
themes, informed by the testimony of experts, staff and academic observers taken under 
oath.  IDC field visits are supported by a travel budget and involve trips to DFID offices 
and projects, ensuring personal contact with DFID’s work in the field. The IDC is also a 
vehicle for fostering public understanding of aid effectiveness, inserting a level of realism 
into the public, and Parliament’s, expectations from its development programme.  Unlike 
the situation in both Canada and Norway where parliamentary committees responsible 
for foreign affairs must also oversee development matters, in the UK separate 
committees give greater coverage and attention to development issues.  A parliamentary 
committee for development has the space and the mandate to take development out of 
the politicized environment of the house floor, providing a haven for cross-party 
discussion and consensus building.  It can become a channel of communication linking 
the public, the government and the development department in way that ensures 
accountability, engagement and a more informed policy.    
DEVELOPMENT POLICY PROCESSES 
 
Development policy processes across Government institutions and within donor 
agencies are important drivers of perceived donor performance.  The UK and Norwegian 
cases offer lessons for both the manner in which Government articulates its 
development policy and the way civil society executes and informs this policy.    
A written statement of the Government’s aspirations for development can ensure a clear 
and coherent political vision for development policy.  At minimum, this statement needs 
to have the support of the Minister of Development, the Finance Ministry and senior civil 
servants.  In both the UK and Norway, a White Paper is the name given to a major 
parliamentary paper enunciating government policy that is not necessarily expected to 
be a basis for future legislation. It is a paper that is consulted on widely among 
Government departments, although primarily the responsibility of the department that will 
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have to implement its statements with contributions from the Treasury (Whaites, 1998: 
209).   Since 1997, the UK has produced four White papers with an exclusive focus on 
international development (Department for International Development, 1997, 2000, 
2006b, 2009a), while Norway has produced two (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2004, 2009).  In Canada, technically only one White Paper has exclusively treated the 
theme of international development (CIDA, 2002).  Most White Papers in Canada have 
notionally presented development policy within the context of broader foreign policy 
reviews, as in the case of the 2005 International Policy Statement. Combining 
development topics within a foreign policy White Paper risks subordinating development 
into a second-tier concern and risks only grudging support from the development 
ministry and minister, ostensibly chief executors of the policy.  Incorporation in a foreign 
policy review is no  guarantee of policy coherence in practice. In Norway and the UK, a 
strong White Paper on development, in combination with some key statements from the 
Head of Government and/or Minister of Development, provided a robust platform for 
development policy widely supported among key bureaucratic actors.     
A White Paper must also serve an expression of the Government’s vision for achieving 
poverty reduction.  Nevertheless, the 2002 Canadian paper authored by CIDA offered 
little more than a statement of how it intended to comply with demands for aid 
effectiveness.  Unlike the Norwegian and British White Papers, it did not provide either a 
vision on matters of substantive policy or serve as an aspirational statement.  When 
Government policy is developed without an over-arching purpose and is slowly “drip-fed” 
(Morton, 2009), operational guidelines, business processes and strategies risk 
multiplying to the point of both incomprehensibility and inconsistency.  The result is not 
only inefficiency but also incoherence.  Lack of clear direction contributes to easily 
shifted priorities and duplicative management processes, all to the detriment of CIDA’s 
effectiveness (Auditor General of Canada, 2009: 17).  While the Auditor General 
recommends a comprehensive strategy for CIDA on aid effectiveness, in the current 
political environment another strategy process to renew CIDA risks being outdated 
almost as soon as it is written.  A new strategy document for CIDA can never 
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compensate for the Government’s “acute attention deficit disorder” on matters of 
development policy.45  
Clear and coherent documented expressions of political will is an important way to 
strengthen CIDA, particularly as a bureaucratic actor centrally embedded in inter-
governmental processes.  Not only does a clear White Paper on development signal 
policy direction that can bring with it some administrative rationality within CIDA, it is also 
a vehicle for securing CIDA’s position in inter-departmental meetings of civil servants, an 
important arena for policy making (Morrison, 1998: 443).  Clear and coherent political 
statements can embolden CIDA officials lower in the bureaucracy who otherwise tend to 
limit their aspirations in anticipation of resistance from other departments.  A strong 
expression of political will in a White Paper is a vehicle for improving CIDA’s relative 
bargaining position in inter-departmental negotiations. 
As Government articulates its policies, civil society actors in both Norway and Canada 
are important for how this policy gets executed.  One can consider the functions of civil 
society in implementation in three main ways: to deliver services to the poor and in 
situations of humanitarian distress; to improve public awareness of international 
development that ensures public support and to build vibrant civil societies in the 
developing world that hold local decision makers to account; and give poor people a 
voice (OECD 2006: 56–57).  While policy implementation is a key reason for financing 
civil society, its knowledge and experience are also valuable for improving 
development policy.  Policy creation can thus also be an objective for civil society 
actors in development. 
While Canada has a long history engaging with civil society, there is a need to ascertain 
whether its financing is being targeted according to some or all of the aims above. Both 
Norway and the UK have delineated financing windows linked to all of the functions of civil 
society listed, as well as principles that guide the nature of donor engagement 
(Department for International Development, 2006a; NORAD, 2009).  The UK approach is 
particularly interesting, where engagement is defined via the use of short term, medium 
term and long-term financing instruments aimed at either small, medium and large 
                                                 
45 See http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/11/18/f-vp-stewart.html  
(Accessed April 29, 2010) 
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organizations.  Consideration is also given to the relative balance between service 
delivery, local civil society involvement, public support functions sought and levels of 
financial dependency on DFID.46  The Civil Society Unit in DFID is currently organized as a 
small staff of 15 people47 managing 62 civil society actors centrally, with 34 organizations 
managed directly by country offices.  This compares to Canadian Partnership Branch 
(CPB), the largest CIDA unit managing support for civil society, which had 151 staff 48 in 
2007 and provided support to 294 organizations in 2006/2007, with no operational support 
to Southern civil society actors (OECD, 2007: 50; CIDA, 2009).   
Canada may want to reflect on the ways in which a more strategic orientation can be 
brought to bear on its activities with civil society. Some examples of what might be 
meant by a “strategic orientation” are offered here.  Both Norway and the UK distinguish 
a small group of civil society actors that are designated as core partners; moreover for 
the UK these core partners do not necessarily need to be UK-based.  These 
organizations obtain relatively unrestricted funds for 3–5 years, often with light touch 
reporting requirements given previously established credibility with the donor.  The UK 
provided support to only 19 civil society actors via Partnership Programme Agreements 
valued at USD 165 million over 2008/2009 (Department for International Development, 
2009c: 29 and Table 19), while Norway provided USD 212 million via Cooperation 
Agreements to 28 actors in 2010 (NORAD, in-house).  Canada may want to consider a 
similarly concentrated approach to the civil society funding provided by Canadian 
Partnership Branch. 
Moreover, both Norway and the UK are able to fund local civil society actors registered 
in developing countries.  In contrast, CIDA funds only a tiny fraction of local civil society 
actors in what seems to be exceptional circumstances.49  Promoting local civil society 
actors offers greater prospect for integrating local voices and ensuring accountability to 
beneficiary communities.  Yet CPB only engages with these actors indirectly through the 
Canadian or international organizations that they fund.  It is unclear whether it is the 
desire for political management over Canadian actors or the perceived challenges in 
holding foreign bodies accountable that impedes direct engagement with local civil 
                                                 
46 DFID is now considering limiting its support up to 50% of NGO revenues. 
47 Occasionally, contract management functions are outsourced by DFID.   
48 (OECD, 2007: 50) 
49 The non-domestic actors in Table 8 mainly comprise international organizations.  
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society actors. Norway and the UK are both able to ensure accountability with regular 
fiduciary checks on organizations and via a field presence that allows them to maintain 
key relationships.  Consideration should be given to the possibility of some direct 
engagement between CIDA and local civil society actors that can offer better prospects 
for sustainable development.   
One important obstacle to engagement with local civil society lies in the fact that donors 
like to exploit their civil society programmes to advance their narrow domestic political 
interests.  This politicization often results in financial grants being provided to national 
organizations in exchange for their support of Government policy, where this support 
also buys silence on more controversial issues of development policy.  While all 
countries need to navigate such tensions, no viable civil society programme should feel 
the need to use the “stick” of finance to actively and intentionally silence public debate. 
DFID has gone further than most in embracing criticism from the organizations that it 
actively funds, explicitly seeking to encourage contacts and knowledge exchange 
between civil society actors like the Overseas Development Institute, often openly and 
vocally critical of DFID.  At the same time, it needs to be recognized that too much 
criticism threatens the positive public image for development, an image that NGOs are 
instrumental in creating.50  Fostering public support needs to consider the use of  
“carrots” rather than “sticks” when dealing with civil society.  The use of “reverse 
lobbying” in the UK to get civil society to campaign on issues and “revolving door” 
employment opportunities in Norway between civil society and government are less 
publicized vehicles for cultivating this support and informing development programming 
with grassroots knowledge.  Building these relationships by opening up channels of 
access between civil society and donors can prevent the current situation in Canada 
where  “rather than being its strongest advocates, the NGOs are often CIDA’s greatest 
critics” (Brown & Jackson, 2009). Canada might therefore consider greater use of non-
financial incentives in its civil society programme that can build relationships with the 
sector and provide the basis for wider public support for development.     
 Lastly, Canada may want to consider changes to the 1980 reform in CIDA that saw the 
organization outsource all project implementation to civil society actors.  This 
                                                 
50 Canada may have discovered this too late as budget cuts in the 1990s disproportionately affected 
NGOs engaging in development education (Morrison, 1998: 416). 
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outsourcing has turned CIDA staff into glorified contract managers rather than 
development specialists, keeping them even more removed from frontline development 
outcomes (Morrison, 1998: 450).  This has eroded the fine-grained knowledge of 
developing countries and sectors within the agency as managerial skills become 
increasingly valued.  While there may have been grounds for shifting CIDA’s main 
functions to contract management if it had exclusively sought to finance programmes 
rather than administer projects, this has not been case (Auditor General of Canada, 
2009: 22).   Moreover Norway and the UK are both examples of strong champions of 
programmatic investments that have nonetheless maintained a source of specialized 
knowledge and skills in NORAD and DFID respectively.   The relationship between 
NORAD and the MFA in this regard suggests perhaps the value of considering greater 
engagement between CIDA and the International Development Research Centre 
(IDRC), where the latter is world renowned both for its technical and evaluation 
expertise.  On both counts, there is perhaps value in drawing on this national source of 
knowledge to inform CIDA’s activities, although this should certainly not come at the 
expense of IDRC’s autonomy nor its commitment to Southern capacity-building that are 
both sources of its comparative strength.  
MICRO-ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOUR 
 
While micro-organizational dynamics were not a focus for this paper per se, some 
understanding of the inner sanctums of Norwegian and UK development institutions 
could be gleaned via interviews as well in informal interactions with staff.  What struck 
was the oft-repeated description of Norway as a “flexible” donor, while in the UK it was 
its “openness to ideas” and its “innovative spirit” that were widely mentioned.  While 
neither term is easy to access and make sense of, particularly given the short duration of 
time spent within each office, there is some reason to believe these sentiments point to 
cultural and behavioural dynamics surrounding the use of discretion within aid agencies 
that require further examination.51  
In both the Norwegian and British cases, staff highlighted the importance of a culture 
where discretion is strategic rather than indiscriminate.  In Norway, the privilege of a 
                                                 
51 This is also supported via a growing literature on cultural dynamics inside aid agencies (Eyben, 2006; 
Harper, 2000; Harper, 1998; Mosse, 2005a, b). 
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healthy budgetary position that translates into high levels of aid and a trusting 
Scandinavian sensibility appears to have fostered discretion with limited regard for the 
costs of discretion.  These costs hinge from the phenomenon of “shooting at anything 
that moves,” resulting in the dispersion of priorities, aid fragmentation, the subtle 
politicization of the aid program and limited concern impact and efficiency.  As one 
Norwegian interviewee highlighted: 
Flexibility is a self perception and is true [in Norway] but it is also a weakness as 
it fits with ambitious politicians’ desire to see Norway present everywhere…and 
fits with a focus on good intentions rather than a focus on results. 
By contrast, in the UK employees laud discretion because it occurs within the framework 
of an unambiguous purpose (poverty reduction) and a clear and coherent performance 
assessment system linking the work of individuals to DFID’s broader Public Service 
Agreements.  This makes the bounds of the risk/reward tradeoff within discretion clear.   
Discretion becomes less the ease of accommodating everyone on everything, but 
exercising the right to choose selectively with knowledge of the appropriate limits to this 
right.  The UK seems to acknowledge better than most that there is, indeed that there 
has to be, discretion in the working life of their civil servants.  This is because discretion 
by those closest to the problem is often needed to engage effectively in development, as 
well as because there are inherent opportunities for discretion in the complex, diffuse, 
global realm of development policy work.52  A relatively liberal attitude to risk is needed 
to achieve poverty outcomes and impacts in the fluid, uncertain and politically 
challenging contexts of development.   But rather than tolerate a completely 
indiscriminate approach to discretion, the UK has used common sense (rather than 
demanding outright altered regulations with the Treasury or the National Audit Office) to 
define what constitutes reasonable risks compatible with discretion.  In turn, the UK 
political structure has been more willing to apply their rules and regulations with greater 
exceptionalism vis-a-vis DFID,53 perhaps recognizing that development policy does not 
hold the identical claims of accountability of other departments given the Department 
                                                 
52 In this sense, development workers in the field can be thought of as “street-level bureaucrats” where 
discretion emerges from work that they do that is removed from direct oversight and involves functions 
that are not easily translated into rote tasks because fine-grained judgment is required (Lipsky, 1980).   
53 For example, by permitting budgetary commitments to extend beyond the three-year budget cycle in 
the UK, or by embracing a more encompassing understanding of “value” in National Audit Office reports.   
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must also consider the claims of beneficiaries external to UK jurisdiction.  Strategic 
discretion is also a way to retain talented staff in DFID, particularly those from younger 
generations less accustomed to rigid rule application and bureaucratic hierarchy, 
seeking greater independence, room for creativity and intellectual fulfillment in the 
workplace.54  A culture of strategic discretion also gives DFID the space and time to 
learn from its mistakes and serves as the ultimate source of transparency, innovation, 
and knowledge.  Yet, currently in the UK, the boundaries delineating an acceptable 
risk/reward ratio are in flux as standard Whitehall concerns about value for money, 
efficiency and impact infiltrate its culture, posing some danger to its strategic discretion. 
In Canada, observers have pointed to the “pathological” risk aversion within CIDA 
(Brown & Jackson, 2009; Brown, forthcoming; Government of Canada, 2007: 91).   
Although the intention of performance management within the administrative doctrine of 
New Public Management (NPM) is to give managers the “freedom to manage” and then 
assessing their performance of the basis of measured outcomes (Osborne & Gaebler, 
1992), CIDA is a casebook example of the criticism that NPM promotes “accountancy” 
rather than “accountability” (Brown & Jackson, 2009; Power, 1997).  This is not only due 
to the fallacy of the NPM prescription because CIDA too has also been culturally inclined 
to turn “management attempts to impose new policies or practices…. into discussions of 
process and implementation procedures” (Morrison, 1998: 449).  A penchant for process 
has partly contributed to the adoption of management systems that have not accepted 
the necessity and value of strategic discretion.55  This is worrisome given calls by the 
Auditor General for more “corporate management processes to guide and monitor the 
implementation of CIDA’s aid effectiveness commitment” (Auditor General of Canada, 
2009: 3).  This risks weighing CIDA, described as an “overburdened ‘Christmas tree’” by 
Morrison (1998), with additional unnecessary ornamentation. 
                                                 
54 In interviews, there was much anecdotal reference to DFID being one of the most sought-after 
departments amongst “FastStream” candidates, an accelerated graduate program for new recruits to the 
civil service.  DFID is often placed above the Treasury and Foreign and Commonwealth Office. CIDA is, 
however, also a popular ministry for new recruits within the Recruitment for Policy Leaders Programme of 
the Government of Canada, a recruitment vehicle targeting a similar demographic to FastStream. 
55 The phenomenon of results management systems failing and yet begetting more of the same is 
perhaps an illustration of this.  
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Table 10 - Summary of lessons for Canada's development cooperation 
Dimension  Caveats and comments 
1. Strategy for renewal 
a. A compelling vision for 
development 
Should be clear, coherent and stable.  
Honest about motivations and tradeoffs. 
In its absence, organizational renewal will never be as 
successful.    
b. Political leadership  Political leadership does not need a foundation of 
strong public support as the latter can be a product of 
the former. 
In its absence organizational renewal will never be as 
successful.   
c. Political interests The single most important determinant on choice of aid 
architecture. 
Can be serviced by championing global development 
policy norms. 
d. Foster bipartisan support Link national unity with international solidarity aims. 
2. Governance structures 
a. Integrate development policy and 
administration 
Crown corporations do not integrate these functions 
but insulate administration from policy-making. 
b. A separate ministry of 
development with primary 
responsibility for development 
Can accommodate strategic national interests and 
better placed to defend a robust development policy. 
A timeless structural form that can accommodate shifts 
in function. 
Make a separate development ministry legally 
autonomous from a ministry of foreign affairs. 
Led by an experienced politician acting as a Minister in 
Cabinet with a single portfolio. 
c.  A robust legislated mandate for a 
development ministry 
Focus should be on all development activities. 
Emphasis exclusively on likely impact on poverty. 
Should empower a development ministry.  
d. A separate Parliamentary 
committee for development 
Enhances public accountability, builds public support 
and engenders an informed development policy 
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Table 10.  Cont’d 
 
Dimensions Caveats and comments 
3. Development policy processes 
a. A White paper with an exclusive 
focus on international development 
and with widespread support across 
Government 
Provides a coherent and clear statement of 
Government vision for reducing poverty and a robust 
platform for development policy. 
Possesses widespread support across Government. 
b. Strategic engagement with civil 
society 
Target finance according to aims of civil society 
programming. 
Provide longer-term unrestricted funding to a small 
number of trusted civil society actors. 
Engagement with local civil society actors. 
Use non-financial incentives to build relations between 
donors and civil society. 
Move away from contract management by cultivating 
development specialism both in-house and in 
partnership with the IDRC. 
4. Micro-organizational behavior 
a. Strategic discretion This is needed because autonomy is inherent in 
development management but limits should also be 
set. 
Continual assessment of risk/reward tradeoff 
compatible with the need for discretion. 
A means for retaining talented staff. 
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CONCLUSION 
Assessing donor performance is not an exact science, and drawing lessons from the 
performance of others is even harder. Nevertheless, this paper has made some 
attempt to tackle the broad question of what fosters donor performance in the UK and 
Norway, with a view to informing current debates on the renewal of Canadian 
development cooperation. The hope is to encourage a conversation on reform 
options based on common understandings of comparative primary evidence, rather 
than on intuition, conviction or doctrine. This evidence from the UK and Norway can 
hopefully provide an empirical basis upon which to weigh competing 
recommendations for change emanating from various quarters in Canada.  Canada 
can and should learn from the experiences of Norway and the UK.  Dismissing the 
experiences of both countries as simply “the product of the right set of circumstances 
at the right time” is untenable (Canadian International Council, 2010: 82), as all 
policy decisions everywhere are ultimately the product of their contexts. The key 
question is how to replicate the basic mechanisms underpinning the success of 
Norway and the UK in development within the Canadian context, as well as reflecting 
on the ways contexts can also evolve.  In this regard, tackling endemic political 
obstacles is a necessary precursor to a successful reform of Canada’s development 
programme and cannot be ignored.  Enthusiasts of reform risk setting public 
expectations for improvement too high, as all too often declarations of a new dawn 
achieved by re-designing organigrams are left unfulfilled, contributing to further 
disappointment and disillusionment.  
In choosing a governance structure, Canada should consider a separate and formally 
autonomous ministry with full responsibility for the design of development policy and its 
administrative execution.  This administrative unit should remain embedded within the 
inter-governmental political process where development policy ultimately gets 
negotiated and made.  Given this, there is much to value in the de facto ministerial 
status that CIDA currently possesses.  More effort should be devoted to strengthening 
CIDA’s position, drawing on the experiences of other donors like Norway and the UK 
wherever possible.  While a combination of frustration and impatience may lead us to 
conclude change will only arrive with a costly and dramatic re-organization or even the 
outright abolishment of CIDA, the ghosts of eras past risk haunting any new 
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organizational structure, particularly if the ghost represents a continuing lack of political 
leadership and an incoherent vision for development policy.  Addressing the limitations 
that currently thwart performance of Canada’s development cooperation in its current 
institutional format is perhaps a harder, if absolutely necessary, first step on the path to 
successful and sustainable reform.    
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